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Bi:
Race, Sexual Orientation, Gender, and Disability
RUTH COLKER*
IWflut is there about a continuun that is unsatisfyingfrightening? Why must
ife-and we-be seen in either "black" or "white," with no shades in
between?1
The category which most closely reflecs the individual's recognition in his
community should be used for purposes of reporting on persons who are of
mixed racial and/or ethnic origins.2
I. INTRODUCTION
In this Article, I will examine various middle or "bi" categories-
multiracial, bisexual, transgendered, 3 and bi-abled.4 The purpose of this broad-
* Copyright, Ruth Colker. Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh; A.B., Harvard-
Radcliffe College, 1978; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1981. A longer version of this Article
will be published as a book by New York University Press in 1996, tentatively entitled
Bipolar Injustice. I would like to thank Jules Lobel and Benjamin Zipursky for their
comments on an earlier draft, Jody Armour and Bill Rubenstein for their useful
conversations on this topic, and Debra Sherman (J.D., University of Pittsburgh, 1996) for
her excellent research assistance and conversations. I would also like to thank the University
of Pittsburgh School of Law for its generous support for this project through a summer
research stipend, an extra research assistant, and a lively summer colloquium. Finally, I
would like to thank the Feminist Law Forum at the University of Pittsburgh for organizing a
helpful discussion of an earlier draft of this Article.
I Judy Scales-Trent, Connonalities: On Being Black and White, Different, and the
Same, 2 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 305,324 (1990).
2 United States Office of Management and Budget, Statistical Policy Directive No. 15,
Race and Ethnic Standards for Federal Statistics and Administrative Reporting (May 12,
1977), reprinted in 59 Fed. Reg. 29,831, 29,834 (June 9, 1994) (reprinting Directive No.
15 and discussing proposed revisions to this Directive).
3By "transgendered," I include transvestites, transsexuals, and hermaphrodites, as
well as individuals who are considered to be androgynous.
4 We have no term to describe individuals who are neither disabled nor able-bodied.
Thus, I have coined the term "bi-abled."
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ranging inquiry is to improve our understanding of the nature of group-based
subordination 5 in society and to help us develop fair and effective ameliorative
programs to redress that history of subordination. Typically, we think of group-
based subordination as bipolar in nature-whites dominate blacks, 6
heterosexuals dominate gay men and lesbians, men dominate women, and able-
bodied people dominate disabled people.7 When we create remedial programs,8
we therefore try to remedy this subordination by offering programs for blacks,
women, gay men and lesbians, and disabled people.
An examination of the bi categories will reveal the inadequacy of our
description of subordination, as well as the simplicity of our ameliorative
programs. Our description of subordination is incomplete, I will argue, because
the bi categories are frequently ignored or invisible. It is too simplistic, for
example, to say that our society disdains blacks, gay men and lesbians, or
women. Those statements beg the question of who is considered to be black, a
gay man or lesbian, and female. Similarly, they do not tell us how society
treats individuals who are ambiguously black, gay or lesbian, or female. How
society responds to bi individuals, I will argue, reflects in part how determined
5 1 am concerned about the problem of subordination rather than the larger problem of
differentiation or discrimination, because the term "subordination" reflects a group-based
historical understanding of oppression faced by individuals in our society. Differentiation or
discrimination is not always subordinating. For a general discussion of the problem of
subordination, see Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal
Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003 (1986).
6 1 use the term "black" rather than African-American because, as I will discuss in Part
If, individuals who are considered to be black are not necessarily predominantly African-
American. I also use the word "black" in lowercase in order to emphasize its arbitrary,
rather than fixed, meaning.
7 Virtually all of the commentators whom I cite in this Article, as well as the major
articles on the topic of subordination, rely on this premise and therefore do not question
what we mean by "blacks," "women," "gay men and lesbians," or "disabled people." See,
e.g., Derrick Bell, Forward: The Civil Rights Chronicles, 99 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1985)
(race); Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955 (1984)
(gender). My own work also suffers from this premise. See Colker, supra note 5. But see
Mary C. Dunlap, The Constitutional Rights of Sexual Minorities: A Cis of the
Male/Female Dichotomy, 30 HASTINGS LJ. 1131 (1979) (challenging premise that only two
sexes exist); Ian F. Haney LUpez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on
Ilusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 10 (1994) (describing
race as "plastic, inconstant, and to some extent volitional").
8 In each of these areas, however, we have not necessarily even begun to create
ameliorative programs. As I will discuss in Part IH.B, we rarely create ameliorative
programs on the basis of sexual orientation. Similarly, as I will discuss in Part IV.B, we
usually condone discrimination rather than create ameliorative programs in the gender area
for individuals who identify as transvestites or transsexuals.
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it is to retain a polarized classification scheme. As I will demonstrate,
sometimes an individual's presence in a bi category can help alleviate
subordinating practices, whereas other times it can actually enhance
subordination. Thus, for example, society is extremely intolerant of
transsexuals who challenge the polarized gender classification scheme,9 but is
not nearly as intolerant of individuals who are, what I call, bi-abled.Yo And,
ironically, the more labels that society generates to describe the middle
categories, the more intolerant society seems to be of the middle. Therefore, we
have four terms to describe bigendered individuals-transsexual, transvestite,
hermaphrodite, and androgyny-and no term to describe bi-abled individuals.
In sum, our investigation of the bi categories helps us understand how strongly
society desires to maintain artificial polarities and how society uses coercive
mechanisms to retain these polarities.
An examination of the bi categories can also provide us insight into how to
develop fair and effective ameliorative programs. Using the emerging field of
disability rights law as my model, I will argue that we need to be more
individualized in our understanding of who is deserving of ameliorative
treatment. Because some individuals who are bi suffer enhanced subordination
because of their bi status, whereas other individuals are somewhat protected
from subordination because of their bi status, we should not assume that all
individuals who fall into a particular category have faced the same kind or
degree of subordination. Our current system of designing ameliorative
programs, I will argue, is too simplistic in its assumptions about the correlation
between membership in a category and a history of subordination. The
disability rights model, I will argue, does a somewhat better job through its
individualized assessments, although this model is not entirely effective because
class bias, as well as stereotypes about disabilities, sometimes infects this
model. I will therefore suggest that an effective individualized model must have
strong procedural safeguards to protect against subjective bias. Moreover, I will
suggest that administrative problems may sometimes require us to combine a
group- and individually-based model. We need to be mindful of the resources
necessary to construct a fair and effective individually-based model; a purely
individually-based model is rarely feasible.
The issues raised in this Article are timely. The United States Census
Bureau is presently considering whether to add the category of "mixed race" to
its survey instrument." Athletic organizations are trying to decide whether to
9 See infra part IV.A. But see Tina Gaudoin, Prisoner of Gender: Is Adrogyny the New
Sexual Ideal? HARPER'S BAzAAR, June 1993, at 114, 116 (suggesting that androgyny is the
new sexual ideal).
10 See infra part V.
11 See infra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
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recognize male-to-female transsexuals as women for sports participation. 12 In
proposing affirmative action plans on the basis of sexual orientation, some
institutions are wondering whether to provide affirmative action for bisexuals in
addition to gay men and lesbians. 13 Finally, courts and society are trying to
determine who is sufficiently disabled to fall within the protection of the
Americans with Disabilities Act. 14 I will argue that each of these classification
dilemmas should challenge us to find more individualized ways to determine
who in our society is deserving of ameliorative treatment.
The challenges presented by this classification problem are two-fold. On
the one hand, we need to find ways to allow individuals to identify as
multiracial, transgendered, bisexual, and bi-abled without fearing that moving
off of one polar point on the traditional bipolar scheme will subject them to
subordination and necessarily preclude them from taking advantage of
ameliorative programs. On the other hand, we need to make sure that programs
which are designed primarily to assist individuals to overcome a history of
subordination are not being used by individuals who have been largely shielded
from that subordination through their presence in a bi category. I will therefore
argue that our awareness and recognition of the bi categories force us to be
more individualized in understanding both the nature of subordination and the
structure of effective and fair ameliorative programs.
The structure of this Article reflects its two-part theme, as well as its
analogy to disability rights. Within each area of the law that I examine in this
Article-race (Part EI), sexual orientation (Part I), gender (Part IV), and
disability (Part V)-I will first ask what the bi categories can tell us about the
nature of subordinating treatment itself. Then, I will use those insights to
consider how we can more effectively design ameliorative programs that are
more individualized in their consideration of who is entitled to ameliorative
treatment. When I discuss disability issues in Part V, I will inquire into the
problems we can expect to encounter through the use of a more individualized
model, like the disability model. By considering some of the pragmatic
12 See Richards v. United States Tennis Ass'n, 400 N.Y.S.2d 267 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1977) (granting preliminary injuction to professional tennis player, Dr. Renee Richards,
who had undergone sex reassignment surgery to prevent her from having to pass a sex-
chromatin test to compete in women's professional tennis). See generally Pamela B. Fastiff,
Gender Venfication Testing: Balancing the Rights of Female Athletes with a Scandal-Free
Olympic Games, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 937 (1992).
13 See Jeffrey S. Byrne, Affirmative Action for Lesbians and Gay Men. A Proposal for
True Equality of Opportunity and Workforce Diversity, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 47, at 93
n.190 (1993).
14 See, e.g., Obesity Bias Lawsuit: Woman Sues Movie Theater over Access,
NEWSDAY, Feb. 25, 1994, at 53 (describing situation in which woman was not allowed to
use her own chair in the wheelchair section of a movie theater) [hereinafter Obesity Bias].
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difficulties with the individualized model, I will try to blend the group-based
and individualized approaches to suggest how we could more fairly and
effectively design ameliorative programs.
II. RACE
Children born to parents of different races15 were more than three percent
of the births in 1990, up from one percent in 1968.16 Since 1980, the number
of black and white interracial married couples has increased from 651,000 to
1.2 million. 7 This change reflects a seventy-eight percent increase since
1980.18 The rate of interracial marriage is even higher for other racial groups-
thirty-eight percent of American-Japanese females, eighteen percent of
American-Japanese males, and seventy percent of American Indians enter into
interracial marriages. 19 The racial classification system used by our legal
system, however, has not kept up with this demographic trend.20
The term "multiracial" is rarely acknowledged as part of the American
15 The term "race" is itself a socially constructed term:
According to most population geneticists, what we call "races" arise when members of
species become separated over a long enough period of time to develop different
distributions of characteristics. When those differences are substantial enough, races are
said to have developed. The point to keep in mind, however, is that "the level of
differences used as a threshold is entirely arbitrary." Ultimately, if differentiation
increases, interfertility decreases between the various races of a species. Human race
differentiation has not proceeded to the point where interfertility has decreased, and,
given current interaction between races, a decrease in interfertility between human
races is unlikely to develop. Race is therefore principally a social construct that gives
meaning to certain characteristics of groups within a species.
James Lindgren, Seeing Colors, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1059, 1084-85 (1993) (footnotes
omitted); see also Lawrence Wright, One Drop of Blood, NEW YORKER, July 25, 1994, at
46, 50 (noting that scientific research indicates that genetic variation among individuals
from different, accepted racial groups was only slightly greater than the variation within the
groups).
16 Gabrielle S~ndor, The "Other" Anwricans, AM. DEMOGRAPHICS, June 1994, at 36,
at39.
17Id.
18 Id. at38.
19 Wright, supra note 15, at 49 (quoting Tom Sawyer, an Ohio representative to the
United State House of Representatives).20 See, e.g., Wheeler Tarpeh-Doe v. United States, 771 F. Supp. 427, 455-56
(D.D.C. 1991) (considering whether mixed-race child should be considered black for
determination of lost wages), rev'd on other grounds, 28 F.3d 120 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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legal system. As Neil Gotanda stated, "The American legal system today lacks
intermediate or mixed-race classifications." 21 Although Gotanda is correct to
note that the American legal system has frequently failed to acknowledge
mixed-race classifications, he is wrong to state that it lacks mixed-race
classifications. In fact, one might understand many of our current legal
problems as raising questions concerning our classification system for people of
mixed racial heritage.
In this part, I will begin with a brief historical discussion to show that
problems concerning mixed racial heritage are not new to our legal system. We
have always had a sensitivity to color,22 which in some cases affected the
degree of discrimination faced by individuals identified as black. I will then
take this history and apply it to areas of the law in which we purportedly use
racial categories for ameliorative purposes-transracial adoption and affirmative
action. I will suggest that our ameliorative purposes could be best served by
bringing more attention to the spectrum within which individuals experience
racial categorization.
A. Color
We tend to remember Plessy v. Ferguson,23 the segregated-railway-car
case, as challenging the notion of "separate but equal" for blacks and whites,
but the case actually reflected a more radical challenge to the construction of
racial categories. 24 Albion Tourgde, one of the lawyers who undertook to bring
21 Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Consfiution is Color-Blind", 44 STAN. L. REV. 1,
25 (1991).2 2 In this part, I am using the words "light-skinned" and "multiracial" interchangeably;
however, there are important differences that should be recognized. As I have noted above,
nearly all people who we call black are multiracial. Therefore, it is certainly wrong to
suggest or presume that all people who are labeled "black" and who are also multiracial are
also light-skinned. Light-skinned blacks are a subcategory of multiracial blacks. Many
multiracial blacks are not light-skinned. Moreover, skin color obviously exists on a
spectrum, so my reference to "light-skinned" is just an attempt to refer to one part of a
spectrum of color rather than to designate any point that can be easily defined. Thus, both
the phrases "light-skinned" and "multiracial" are inevitably imprecise. I am using both
phrases to draw attention to people who do not perfectly fit a clear definition of "black," but
recognize that neither phrase perfectly achieves that meaning.
23 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding as constitutional the Louisiana statute that provided
for segregated railway cars, which had been challenged by Plessy, a mixed-race defendant
who had been convicted under this statute).
24 Pe.ssy is not the only case to challenge the racial classification system. In
McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964), for example, the defendants successfully
challenged their convictions under a Florida law that imposed stiffer criminal penalties on
[Vol. 56:1
1994]
about Plessy, "urged his associates to select as a defendant a Negro whose
complexion was white or nearly white." 25 Defendant was "'of mixed Caucasian
and African blood, in the proportion of one-eighth African and seven-eighths
Caucasian,' the African admixture not being perceptible." 26 The arbitrariness
of our system of racial assignment was at the heart of Tourge's attack on the
Louisiana statute. For example, he argued,
The Court will take notice of the fact that, in all parts of the country, race-
intermixture has proceeded to such an extent that there are great numbers of
citizens in whom the preponderance of the blood of one race or another, is
impossible of ascertainment, except by careful scrutiny of the pedigree....
Bnt [sic] even if it were possible to determine preponderance of blood and
so determine racial character in certain cases, what should be said of those
cases in which the race admixture is equal. Are they white or colored?27
Tourg6e's strategy was controversial because darker members of the
African-American community thought that it would only benefit those who
were nearly white or wanted to pass as white.28 His strategy raised a
controversy concerning the nature of discrimination itself. By alleviating
discrimination for light-skinned blacks who can "pass" as white, are we really
ridding society of its most invidious forms of discrimination?
mixed-race couples that were unmarried and cohabitated than on same-race couples that
were unmarried and cohabitated. As part of their challenge, petitioners unsuccessfully
questioned the legitimacy of the State's classification system. Appellants challenged the
manner in which their race was identified; the arresting officer had established their race
based on physical appearance. Id. at 187-88 n.6. Appellants argued "that the statutory
definition is circular in that it provides no independent means of determining the race of a
defendant's ancestors and that testimony based on appearance is impermissible because not
related to any objective standard." Id. Although the Supreme Court overturned the
conviction, it did not consider this due process argument. Throughout the decision, the
Court refers to appellants as "Negro" without justifying its categorization. As in Pesy, in
which petitioners challenged the right of the railway company to make facial judgments
concerning race, the petitioners in McLaughlin challenged the right of the police officer to
make facial judgments concerning race. This argument, however, has never been seriously
accepted by our courts. I thank Bill Rubenstein for bringing this case to my attention.
25 JACK GREENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON JUDICIAL PROCESS AND SOCIAL
CHANGE: CONSTmIUrIONAL LITIGATION 585 (1977).
26 Brief for Plaintiff in Error at 3, Peisy (No. 210), reprinted in 13 LANDMARK BRIEFS
AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: CONSTrrTUTIONAL LAW
28, 30 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Casper eds., 1975).
27 Id. at 10.
28 GREENBERG, supra note 25, at 585.
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The color issue raised by Tourgde's legal strategy is rarely remembered; 29
his unsuccessful challenge to the system of separate but equal is the dominant
lasting legacy from his effort.30 One of the few extensive discussions of
Tourgde's legal strategy is written by Professor Cheryl Harris.31 In Whiteness
as Propeny, Harris tells a compelling story about her light-skinned black
grandmother who passed as a white in order to work in a department store.32
Her story demonstrates the relative privilege that can be accorded to some
light-skinned blacks.33 Harris's grandmother was able to obtain employment
while her grandfather, whom I presume was darker-skinned, "was trapped on
the fringes of economic marginality." 34 The story of her grandmother
"passing" is a story about the range of experiences that blacks may endure,
depending on their skin color. It reflects our society's consciousness of color
along a spectrum, rather than its consciousness of race at only two bipolar
points.35 In a society of limited resources, in which we can only accord
affirmative action benefits to a few people, I argue that we may have to grapple
with the question of whether Harris's grandmother is as deserving of
affirmative action as Harris's grandfather.
A story from my own legal practice may better illuminate this point. When
I was working in the Civil Rights Division at the United States Department of
29 Bu see Cheryl L Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1709, 1745-50
(1993) (discussing the Pesry legal strategy).
30 See, e.g., Gotanda, supra note 21, at 38 (describing Pessy as "[tihe well-known
'separate but equal' case").
31 Harris, supra note 29, at 1745-50; see also CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY
CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION (1987).
32 Harris, supra note 29, at 1710-13.
33 Surprisingly, however, Harris does not use the story to further Tourgde's thesis
about the arbitrariness of racial classification. Instead, she simply sees her grandmother as a
black who "passed" without questioning why we call her black at all.
34 Harris, supra note 29, at 1710.
35 1 also wonder if the grandmother truly "passed" in the way that Harris describes.
Did none of her co-workers suspect her black racial background? Had they been taught that
it was acceptable to ignore such background when a person was light-skinned? In the gay
rights context, it has often been my experience that people who think they are passing as
heterosexual are really not passing. Many people may know of their homosexuality, but
have been taught to tolerate it so long as they do not flaunt it. The grandmother certainly
tried to hide her black heritage, but we cannot fully tell from Harris's account whether she
truly passed. Finally, I want to emphasize that by discussing the spectrum along which race
may be experienced, I am not trying to discount the fact that Harris's grandmother suffered
disadvantage because of her race. My point is simply that her skin color allowed her to
mitigate some of those disadvantages while still facing others. Harris's grandmother, for
example, probably attended racially segregated, black schools and lived in racially
segregated, black neighborhoods.
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Justice, I worked with a team of attorneys on a race and gender employment
discrimination case against a bank. The lawyers on the case soon observed that
dark-skinned blacks were hired to perform jobs away from public view, such as
sorting and counting money in the vault, whereas light-skinned blacks36 were
sometimes hired as tellers. The light-skinned blacks were not usually passing;
they were benefitting modestly, as compared with darker-skinned blacks, from
a color conscious society.37 Nonetheless, light-skinned blacks were less likely
to be hired as tellers than similarly qualified whites, and if they were hired as
tellers, they were less likely to be promoted to a managerial position. To label
all the blacks as black would not have truly dismantled the racial classification
system in that workplace. Only by acknowledging the cultural significance
attached to the points along the spectrum of race could one begin to fully
address discrimination at that workplace.38 A failure to recognize the
significance of color in fashioning a remedy causes the problem noted by
Tourgd 's critics-only light-skinned blacks might benefit from a remedial
order. A simple order not to discriminate on the basis of race could foreseeably
benefit light-skinned blacks, by giving them better opportunities to be hired as
tellers and promoted, while doing little for dark-skinned blacks. 39
Ironically, Tourgde's legal strategy, which was attentive to those color
36 Although I call these individuals "light-skinned blacks" during this discussion, they
could more accurately be considered to be a subcategory of multiracial individuals. I say
"subcategory" because not all multiracial individuals are light-skinned. A better way to
understand my reference to their skin color is to understand it as a reference to how
assimilated they are. My discussion of light-skinned blacks could also apply to other
characteristics that blacks may have which may make them more acceptable to whites. For
example, a colleague of mine told me that his wife was told at a job interview with a bank
that it would consider hiring her if she would "relax" her hair. Similarly, black men are
often requested to shave their beards in order to be hired or retained at a job. In both cases,
blacks are being asked to conform their physical appearance to a white standard. Light skin
color is therefore not the only trait that might make some blacks more acceptable to white
society through assimilation to white appearance.
37 To the best of my knowledge, this case was never litigated on the merits. Thus, my
description of the facts reflects my personal belief and not that of the Department of Justice.
The facts were also never held as findings of fact by any court of law. I have therefore told
the story in a way that hopefully keeps the identity of the bank anonymous.
38 The Justice Department settled the case after I had stopped working there; I do not
believe that the settlement was explicitly attentive to color.
39 On the political level, this problem is seen repeatedly in New Orleans, a very color-
conscious city. The three African-Americans to serve as mayor (Dutch Morial, Marc
Morial, and Sidney Barthelemy) have all been very light-skinned, whereas unsuccessful
African-American candidates (such as Bill Jefferson) have often been darker-skinned.
Because New Orleans is a black majority city, it takes color consciousness by both the black
and white communities to achieve these color-conscious results.
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distinctions, was considered conservative at the time and is often described as
conservative today. By looking at contemporary areas of the law that continue
to raise problems of racial classification, I will argue that Tourg~e was post-
modem before his time in challenging racial classification systems for their
arbitrariness. If Tourg~e had been truly vindicated in Brown v. Board of
Education,40 we would be much further along in dismantling the arbitrariness
of our racial classification system.
B. Ameliorative Treatment
In the preceding section, we saw that the property value in whiteness has
been recognized by some civil rights activists since the nineteenth century.
Nonetheless, our description of how racism operates in the United States rarely
mentions color or racial heritage as a factor in the nature of subordination.
Because our description of racism has largely ignored that factor, the
ameliorative programs that we have designed to overcome racism have, not
surprisingly, also ignored color or racial heritage as a factor in determining
who is most worthy of ameliorative treatment. In this section, I will look at two
kinds of programs-affirmative action and racial preference policies in the
adoption context-to exemplify the clumsiness with which we have designed
ameliorative programs on the basis of race.
This discussion is limited to the use of race for ameliorative purposes-
situations in which we are consciously trying to overcome a history of
subordination on the basis of race. Through this discussion, I do not mean to
suggest that, because of their multiracial heritage, people should not be able to
claim discrimination on the basis of race. As I will discuss, nearly all
individuals whom we categorize as black have a multiracial heritage.
Moreover, when someone has actually experienced racial discrimination, it
does little good to speculate how that treatment might have been different if that
person were lighter-skinned or had "relaxed" hair. The discriminatory
treatment speaks for itself and must be redressed. The relief in that case is not
what I call ameliorative; it is direct relief for an identified victim of
discrimination under standard "make whole" principles that are beyond the
scope of this Article.
In the ameliorative category, however, I am not talking about direct relief
for identified victims of discrimination. Instead, I am talking about societal
programs that are developed to respond to group-based subordination in
society. The two programs that I identify are affirmative action and adoptions.
Before discussing these programs, however, I would like to identify the
difficulty with simplistically describing these programs as ameliorative.
40 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
[Vol. 56:1
1994]
Affirmative action programs often have several, possibly simultaneous,
purposes.41 Although they may be ameliorative, they may also serve the
purposes of increasing the diversity of ideas or providing role models.
Moreover, many individuals believe that despite the ameliorative purposes of
affirmative action, an unintended stigma may also result from the use of race-
conscious measures. 42 Because the ameliorative results of race-based
affirmative action become more ambiguous in the multiracial context, focusing
on these individuals adds a new level of difficulty to the problem. I will argue
that recognition of the applicability of affirmative action to multiracial
individuals forces us to be more individualized in devising fair and effective
affirmative action programs.
Racial preference policies in the context of adoption have a highly
contested ameliorative purpose. The National Association of Black Social
Workers, for example, believes that racial classification serves an ameliorative
purpose,43 whereas other leaders in the black community, such as Professor
Randall Kennedy, believe that racial placement policies harm the well-being of
black children and perpetuate racial stereotypes. 44 A focus on the adoption of
multiracial children, who have been historically categorized as black, adds a
further dimension to this tension because, as I will argue, the ameliorative
purposes of race-conscious placement become harder to identify. Because the
ameliorative purposes served by a racial preference policy are less clear in the
transracial adoption context than in the affirmative action context, I will be
more critical of our use of race-conscious policies in the adoption context.
1. Affrmative Action
The classification system that we use for affirmative action purposes has
been driven by a categorization scheme developed on the federal level. Because
this scheme has never recognized multiracial individuals, these individuals have
been largely invisible as we have created affirmative action programs. As I will
41 See infra part ll.B.1.
42 See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN AFFIRMATIvE ACTION BABY 50,
86 (1991).
43 Kim Forde-Mazrui, Black Identity and Oild Placement. The Best Interests of Black
and Bfracial Odlren, 92 MiCH. L. REV. 925, 926 (1994) (quoting NATIONAL ASSOCiATION
OPBLACKSOCIAL WORKERS, PoSrION PAPER (Summer 1973)).
44 Michael Rezendes, Debate Intensifies on Adoptions Across Racial Lines, BOSTON
GLODE, Mar. 13, 1994, at 1, 26 (reporting that "Kennedy, for his part, said that race should
never be considered in adoptions, even if there comes a day when enough black families
can be found to adopt all the black children waiting for families to call their own"); see also
Randall L. Kennedy, Racial C'tiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1818
n.305 (1989) (describing a race-conscious placement as "scandalous").
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argue below, this artificially polarized classification scheme has helped us
ignore the range of subordination that individuals may experience based on
race.
In 1977, the federal government issued Statistical Policy Directive No. 15
to standardize the definition of race used by the public and private sectors. 45
This Directive is still in use and does not include the categories "other" or
"mixed-race." Instead, it categorizes mixed-race individuals into one racial
category: "The category which most closely reflects the individual's
recognition in his community should be used for purposes of reporting on
persons who are of mixed racial and/or ethnic origins. " 46
The Directive's handling of mixed-race individuals is troublesome in two
respects. First, it perpetuates the community's right to define race, rather than
allow individuals to define their own race. Second, it renders the category of
"multiracial" invisible.
The problems with this Directive can be seen in an early affirmative action
controversy from New York City.47 After New York City instituted an
affirmative action program for promotion from police officer to sergeant, six
officers came forward and asked to be reclassified from white to black or
Hispanic. 48 One officer indicated that he had originally checked both "black"
and "white" on the application form, but that the department computer had
arbitrarily classified him as white. A similar problem occurred in Boston when
two firefighters, the Malones, claimed they were black because their maternal
great-grandmother was black.49 The assertion about being black was brought
into question because they did not make that assertion until after they had taken
the first exam for the position. Moreover, there was some question as to
whether they held themselves out in the community as black. At a hearing,
however, two co-workers testified that they knew the firefighters had been
hired as blacks, so the perception within the firefighter community was that
45 See 59 Fed. Reg. 29,831, 29,834 (June 9, 1994) (reprinting Directive No. 15).
46 Id.
47 The classification problem also frequently occurs with the label "Hispanic." See
Alex M. Saragoza et al., History and Public Policy: Title VII and the Use of the Hispanic
Classification, 5 LA RAZA LJ. 1, 1-2 (1992) (discussing question of whether Spaniards
should be included in the "Hispanic" category for the purpose of affirmative action); see
also Haney L6pez, supra note 7, at 10 (describing how he and his brother, both of whom
had a fourth-generation Irish father and Salvadoran immigrant mother, chose different racial
identities).
4 8 Elizabeth Kolbert, White Officers Seek Minority Status, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1985,
atB16.
49 Steven Marantz & Peggy Hernandez, Defining Race a Sensitive, Elusive Task,
BOSTONGLOBE, Oct. 23, 1988, at 33, 40.
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they were black.50
The New York and Boston cases show the awkwardness of racial
classification systems, even for benign purposes. In both cases the question was
whether the public safety employees could be considered black. There was no
discussion of the need for a "mixed-race" category and whether the "mixed-
race" category should be treated differently than the "black" category.
In another context, Randall Kennedy has challenged what he calls the
"racial distinctiveness" thesis-an argument that race or minority status embues
an individual with a distinctive contribution to a field or life experience. 51 The
shortcomings of the racial distinctiveness thesis can be seen especially in the
New York and Boston cases. Nowhere in the classification problem that was
considered did anyone ask whether these individuals had a special reason to be
deserving of affirmative action protection. Had they experienced educational or
economic deprivation because of their racial status? Did they have a special
interest in assisting with public safety problems in minority communities?
Kennedy encourages us to ask these kinds of questions closely within specific
contexts and not to assume that all people of color are alike. Boston and New
York felt more comfortable developing and enforcing clumsy categories of
"black" and "white," with all blacks benefitting from affirmative action and no
whites benefitting, than asking these more probing questions. As a result of
such policies, the Malones of this society will have an incentive in the future,
when seeking the benefits of affirmative action, to check the box "black" at the
earliest possible stages of the application process and not to acknowledge their
mixed-race background. 52 Such actions will perpetuate the "one drop of blood"
rule, under which a person with a known trace of African ancestry is
considered to be black.53
Despite these problems with Directive No. 15, which would not allow any
of these individuals to be classified as mixed-race, the federal government
received strong criticism when it tried to change the policy in 1988. The
proposed 1988 changes would have added the racial category "other" and
required classification by self-identification. 54 Opponents included federal
50Id. at 40.
51 Kennedy, supra note 44, at 1778.
52 See Wright, supra note 15, at 47 (quoting the mother of multiracial children who
said that multiracial individuals know "to check the right box to get the goodies"). Even for
individuals who are recognized as minorities, the specific minority classifications they are
put in can make a big difference in terms of social or economic entitlements. For example,
some native Hawaiians have sought to be labeled "Native Americans," rather than "Asian"
or "Pacific Islanders," which would entitle them to enjoy privileges concerning gambling
concessions that they would not otherwise enjoy. Id.
53 Gotanda, smpra note 21, at 24.
54 59 Fed. Reg. 29,831, 29,832 (June 9, 1994).
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agencies, larger corporations, and members of minority groups:
Respondents who opposed the change asserted that the present system provided
adequate data, that any changes would disrupt historical continuity, and that
the proposed change would be expensive and potentially divisive. Some
members of minority communities interpreted the proposal as an attempt to
provoke internal dissension within their communities and to reduce the official
counts of minority populations.55
Acquiescing to such arguments, the federal government decided not to make
any changes at that time. 56 Nonetheless, in 1993, the federal government again
began to explore making changes in the racial classification system. 57 In June
1994, it invited comments on changes such as "adding an 'other' category,"
"adding a 'multi-racial' category," and "providing an open-ended question to
solicit information on race and ethnicity." 58
It is not clear whether the federal government will be successful in adding
the "multi-racial" category, but the Census Bureau appears to be slowly
moving in that direction. In the 1990 Census, a new box was added to the
survey instrument marked "other." 59 Although ten million people (about five
percent of the United States population) marked "other," the Census Bureau
did not actually take account of their status. 60 It divided them up proportionally
among the other categories. Mixed-race individuals who filled out the forms
may therefore have felt that they were being recognized but, in fact, they were
invisible on the official record books. In 1996, however, the Census Bureau
plans to include a "multiracial" category on its survey instrument. This change
has caused much controversy in the civil rights community. The Association
for Multiethnic Americans, an umbrella group for approximately sixty
multiracial groups, supports the change.61 Billy Tidwell, of the National Urban
League, however, opposes the change because "splintering the black
community between light-skinned and dark, would 'turn the clock back on the
well-being' of African Americans." 62 Tidwell's arguments sound remarkably
like the arguments made against Tourgde's strategy, which challenged the racial
classification system in the nineteenth century. The National Urban League
5 5 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 29,832-33.
59 Hanna Rosin, Boxed in: America's Newest Radal Minority, NEw REPUBLIC, Jan. 3,
1994, at 12.
60Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. (quoting Bill Tidwell).
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wants to insist on its right to claim large numbers of individuals as black who
might self-identify as multiracial. Multiracial groups therefore criticize groups
like the National Urban League for their tendency "to cling to racial differences
and a zero-sum mentality ... ." 63 They argue that Tidwell's position is
disrespectful to mixed-race people who suffer emotionally when they cannot
see their reflection in a box to check.64 It is ironic that the same groups who
have criticized white society for defining them stereotypically are not more
tolerant of the desire of multiracial groups to be able to define themselves more
accurately.
Although the federal government has been slow to recognize the "mixed-
race" category, some private institutions have begun to try to change this
practice of insisting that people classify themselves into rigid categories.
Columbia Law School, for example, asks student applicants for admission who
wish to have their ethnic background taken into account to submit ethnic
statements. In addition, the application invites students to check off more than
one racial or ethnic category if appropriate.65 James Lindgren comments that
the racial classification question makes people feel uncomfortable because it
seems to ask people to indicate how closely they fit racial stereotypes. 66
Similarly, Judy Scales-Trent reports that people feel uncomfortable when she
tries to explain to them that she is a "white black woman," because categories
"make the world appear understandable and safe." 67 On the other hand,
transgressing boundaries to acknowledge the category of "mixed-race" or
"multiracial" is a step toward creating a more individualized sense of the
meaning of race to each person. Such ethnic statements might make us feel
63/d.
64Id.
65 The Columbia Law School application contains the following categories: American
Indian or Alaskan, black or African-American, white or Caucasian, chicano or Mexican-
American, Asian or Pacific Islander, Puerto Rican, other Ifispanic, East Indian, other, and
unknown. The accompanying instructions state,
If you wish to have our Admissions Committee consider your racial or ethnic
background in its evaluation of your candidacy for admission, please indicate your
status by checking one or more of the following categories.
Also, please attach a separate statement describing your ethnic, cultural and linguistic
heritage, and how this identification may have found expression in your academic,
extracurricular or community undertakings.
COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL, APPLICmiON FOR ADMISSION (1994).66 Lindgren, supra note 15, at 1084.
67 Scales-Trent, supra note 1, at 305.
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uncomfortable, but they may be a more respectful way to acknowledge the
socially constructed and individualized experience of race in our society.
Scott Minerbrook, for example, who had a white biological mother, a
black biological father, and a white grandmother who refused to have any
relationship with him, believed that he "felt the injustice of race hate more
keenly than my black friends, because for them, racism didn't reside inside the
fUmily." 68 Minerbrook's classification as multiracial becomes much more
significant when we have an opportunity to hear how race has mattered in his
family history and experience. Similarly, Scales-Trent's experience as a black
person was clearly affected by her light skin color.
The Columbia Law School policy, however, of seeking personal narratives
is not without its problems. First, it seems to presume that the only purpose of
affirmative action is to assist individuals in overcoming historical disadvantage.
Affirmative action for African-Americans in law school admissions, however,
serves other purposes, such as diversifying a student body, educating African-
Americans who can serve as role models for the next generation, and
increasing the quantity and quality of legal services available to the black
community. There is no reason to place the burden of explaining those benefits
on the individual candidate; Columbia Law School is as capable of describing
those benefits as the candidate.69
Second, the Columbia model seems to presume only racial minorities have
a significant ethnic or racial story to reveal. Too often, we think of whites as
not having a race (hence, the label "white," which stands for an absence of
color). To move fully toward a multiracial jurisprudence, however, I would
argue that we need whites as well as others to contemplate the significance of
race in their lives. For many whites, it may be a story of race privilege, but it
is still a story about how race has mattered in their lives. The Columbia model
seems to suggest that not all candidates will comment on their race or ethnicity;
if everyone were expected to comment, then there would be no need to offer an
optional question. And certainly, if the point of the question is to allow
candidates to ask for special treatment to allow them to overcome obstacles that
they have faced in life, then one might well imagine that many whites would
not be able to offer any evidence of special obstacles due to their race. On the
other hand, I believe it would be good for us to have institutions or individuals
encourage us to consider how our race has mattered in our personal history and
68 Sctt Minerbrook, The Pain of a Divided Family, U.S. NEW & WORLD REP., Dec.
24, 1990, at 44.
69 As Justice Blackmun suggests in his dissent in 2ty ofRichmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
488 U.S. 469, 561 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), no individual black person should
have to convince a court that Richmond, Virginia, the "cradle of the Old Confederacy,"
had a history of discrimination against African-Americans because "[h]istory is irrefutable."
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to understand our race as part of a spectrum rather than part of bipolar
categories.
If we collected more histories of how race has mattered in people's lives,
we might be able to determine if darker-skinned blacks are the victims of more
discrimination in our society than lighter-skinned blacks.70 If so, we might
want to create legal or political structures to break down that color
consciousness. 71 The Columbia Law School model might enable us to more
specifically determine who is deserving of affirmative treatment because of
prior social or economic disadvantage, although these disadvantages should not
be the only factors in determining who is worthy of affirmative treatment. An
example may illuminate my argument. Two black individuals may be applying
for admission to Columbia Law School. Candidate number one comes from a
middle-class background. Her parents were university professors, and she went
to schools in middle-class neighborhoods as well as to a private Ivy League
college. Candidate number two comes from a working-class background. His
parents had only a high school education and worked in menial jobs like
janitorial work and housecleaning. He went to a historically segregated black
college in the South. Assuming that both applicants have equivalent grades and
test scores, I would suggest that candidate number two is more deserving of
affirmative action in admissions. Both of them will help diversify the classroom
and serve as role models for blacks in our society, but candidate number two
has experienced a more racially constructed and thereby disadvantaged
educational background than candidate number one. Ideally, we would have
space in our law schools for both candidates, but realistically, we often have to
make difficult choices. I am simply suggesting that a history of disadvantage
may be relevant to making these tough choices.
Our existing race-based affirmative action programs often clumsily use race
70Not everyone agrees on what the implications would be in recognizing the
difference in our treatment of light- and dark-skinned blacks. For example, Lawrence
Wright reports,
Itabari Njeri, who writes about interethnic relations for the Los Angeles
Tunes ... maintains that the social and economic gap between light-skinned blacks and
dark-skinned blacks is as great as the gap between all blacks and all whites in America.
If people of more obviously mixed backgrounds were to migrate to a Multiracial box,
she says, they would be politically abandoning their former allies and the people who
needed their help the most.
Wright, supra note 15, at 54.
71 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993), has contained a prohibition against "color" discrimination since its
inception; however, virtually no cases have been brought under that theory.
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as a proxy for disadvantage without forcing us to inquire into actual histories of
disadvantage. It is time that we try to refine those programs when
individualized determinations are possible. One example of a clumsy
application of affirmative action can show how individualized treatment may
reduce stigma while also more appropriately benefitting those individuals who
have faced race-based disadvantages in society. Naomi Zack, the author of the
powerful book, Race and Mixed Race,72 shares with the reader her own story
of benefitting from affirmative action. Zack recounts that her mother, with
whom she grew up, was a white Jewish immigrant. Her father, who was not
identified to her as her father until she was sixteen, was a black man. Race did
not become a preeminent preoccupation in her life until she returned to
academia in 1990, at the age of forty-six. After doing some adjunct teaching,
she obtained a tenure-track position in the Department of Philosophy, at the
University of Albany of the State University of New York, through a
university (minority) affirmative action recruitment program called Target of
Opportunity (TOP).73 She rationalizes acceptance of this position by noting that
only seventy-five academic philosophers in the United States out of ten
thousand are "of African descent."74 I have no doubt that Zack was worthy of
being hired by the University of Albany because her book is an impressive
philosophical and historical project, as well as very creative.75 Zack's case,
however, seems to reflect a reflexive use of affirmative action rather than
individualized consideration of merit.
Zack's personal history, to the extent that she recounts it for the reader,76
does not seem to reflect much race-based disadvantage. On the other hand,
Zack's work on race issues is profoundly original and deserves our serious
attention. The fact that Zack herself is mixed-race clearly influenced her choice
of topics and analysis. But we do not have to presume that Zack, as a mixed-
race individual, would make an outstanding contribution to scholarship; we
have concrete evidence of that contribution in front of us.
I would therefore argue that Zack was deserving of an appointment at
Albany in a race-related field of study because her scholarship is outstanding. I
would be reluctant, by contrast, to state (based on the available information,
7 2 NAOMI ZACK, RACE AND MIXE RACE (1993).
7 3 Id. at xii.74 Id. at iii.
75 Admittedly, her book was not published until three years after her appointment, but
Zack indicates that she submitted an early draft of portions of the book to the University of
Albany as part of the application process. Id. at xii. Given the time lag between writing and
publishing, it seems plausible that Zack had substantially begun the project at the time of her
appointment.
76 Id.
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which may be incomplete) that Zack is an individual who has faced personal
disadvantages that make her worthy of affirmative treatment. Because we often
use affirmative action both to increase the diversity of scholarly areas of study
and to assist individuals with disadvantaged backgrounds, we avoid the more
difficult and important step of redefining merit to acknowledge the excellence
of the scholarship of someone like Zack. There is no reason to taint Zack's
appointment with the stigma of affirmative action77 and to deprive a more truly
disadvantaged individual from benefitting from affirmative action. Stephen
Carter has said,
Because the principal battleground is affirmative action, which benefits mainly
those least in need of society's aid, there may be a tendency for all of us to
forget who it is that is suffering as the rest of us toss our brickbats: for it is our
people, black people, those on whose behalf all of us claim to be laboring, who
are withering in the violent prisons that many of our inner cities have
become.7 8
Carter argues that we should primarily use affirmative action programs for
individuals in our society who need our special attention.79 If we target
affirmative action in that way, while also redefining merit,80 then more
77 1 realize that the merit-based approach that I am suggesting for Zack's appointment
does not necessarily make any inroads on the stigma problem, because students in a
classroom may presume that affirmative action rather than merit caused a particular
appointment. It is therefore not enough for us to redefine merit to make it clear that we
value the contributions of a particular African-American. In a university setting, professors
or administrators who engaged in that redefinition of merit need to publicly voice their
views regarding the merits of the person who has been hired to overcome the presumption
of incompetence that often accompanies affirmative action appointments. The redefinition of
merit must occur in a public setting, not just in the closed room of a faculty appointment
meeting.
78 CARTER, supra note 42, at 252.
79 Although I agree with Carter that we should do a better job of redefining merit to
lessen the need for affirmative action, I also think we need to be careful not to limit the
purpose of affirmative action to helping individuals overcome societal disadvantage. See
CARTER, supra note 42, at 27. As I discuss below, other rationales for affirmative action do
exist that deserve our serious attention.
80 Clumsy uses of affirmative action, in my view, can often avoid the more probing
discussions of the definition of merit. One of the best examples of this phenomena is
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987), in which the Santa Clara
Transportation Agency successfully defended an affirmative action program in which it
promoted a woman, Joyce, over a man, Johnson. Joyce had been one of the first women
hired in a road maintenance position and appears to have led the way for other women by,
for example, persuading the employer to issue coveralls to her (as it had to the men) so that
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individuals may truly experience expanded opportunities.8'
Instances like Zack benefitting from affirmative action raise the broader
question of what is the purpose of an affirmative action program. I would like
to discuss three rationales. First, a purpose of affirmative action might be to
benefit people who have suffered economic or social disadvantage because of
their race. Under that rationale, Zack might not have been an appropriate
candidate. Second, a purpose might be to hire people with diverse life
experiences that might be reflected in their scholarship. Zack would qualify
under that rationale. Third, a purpose might be to provide role models for
students who are also members of minority groups. Zack might also qualify
under that rationale as a role model both for mixed-race students and black
students (if dominant society views her as black).82
she would not keep soiling her own clothes. Rather than get credit for this activism, she
was labeled as a troublemaker. One panel member described her as a "rebel-rousing, skirt-
wearing person." Id. at 624 n.5. Johnson challenged the selection of Joyce over him
because he scored a 75 as compared to her 73 on an interview. Id. at 623-24. The
institution used affirmative action to justify her promotion rather than redefining merit. As
my colleague, Jules Lobel, has suggested to me, affirmative action as a justification can be a
mechanism that allows white men to avoid confronting their lesser competency as compared
to a woman or a black person. Similarly, Joyce was entitled to be told that she was selected
in part because her advocacy on behalf of women was valued.
81 An example that illuminates this thesis emerges from a conversation I had with my
colleague, Jody Armour. Jody described an educational program in which he has
participated that tries to help disadvantaged blacks get a "better chance" by enabling them
to attend high-achievement high schools. Originally, the program primarily benefitted blacks
from inner-city, segregated schools. Recently, he has seen an increasing number of black
children that apply to the program who come from middle-class backgrounds. It is tempting
for the organizers of this program to pick such children because, given their lesser
disadvantage, they are less at risk of failure in the "better chance" program. I am suggesting
that when we devise a program for the explicit purpose of assisting disadvantaged
individuals in our society, we should stay mindful of that original purpose in selecting
beneficiaries. Nonetheless, I am not suggesting that assisting disadvantaged individuals is the
only possible rationale for affirmative action programs.
82 A fourth rationale that has been suggested to me is that the dynamic on a faculty
might change if sufficient numbers of women and blacks are hired. If one-half of the
members of a faculty were black, it has been suggested that the dynamic at a faculty
meeting would be transformed. This rationale, in my opinion, is related to the second
rationale that I have identified because it presumes a diversity of experience brought to the
room by the black professors. This rationale, however, also suffers from some of the
presumptions of the racial distinctiveness thesis in that it presumes that all blacks inherently
bring a different perspective or dynamic to a faculty. Clarence Thomas's presence on the
United States Supreme Court is an obvious example of the presence of a black individual in
a group not necessarily creating the existence of a new and distinctive voice based on race. I
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Although I have been a part of various faculties since 1985 that have
consciously used affirmative action to increase the number of African-
Americans on the faculty, I have never heard anyone ask about the purpose of
the program in order to evaluate whether someone like Zack is a better
candidate than someone else of African descent.8 3 I believe that it does make
sense to use affirmative action for the first and third purposes that I have
identified above, because those purposes help us overcome a group-based
experience of racial subordination in society. The second purpose, however,
need not be achieved through the use of affirmative action because it can
readily be achieved through redefinition of the term "merit." I agree with
Randall Kennedy, who has observed that it is racist to assume that members of
racial minority groups have an inherently distinctive way of thinking about
race.8 4 If we want to hire someone to teach and write about race issues, then
we should redefine merit by identifying an opening in the field of race
relations, African-American history, or whatever. 85 Then, when someone like
Naomi Zack applies, we might hire her because of her proven expertise in that
field, not simply because she is of African heritage. Zack would be hired
because of her expertise and might not face the stigma of affirmative action.
I realize that this argument will be considered controversial by many
people because it refuses to lump all blacks together as equally deserving of
affirmative action and because it reduces the number of individuals labeled
"black." If an institution only accepts rationale number one for affirmative
action, then it limits affirmative action to those individuals who can
am not comfortable with making the global assumption that the presence of additional
blacks (or women) on a faculty inherently creates a distinctive voice, although it may be
true in many individual cases. I have therefore not identified this rationale as a separate
rationale.
83My presentation at a faculty symposium, however, has now provoked such a
discussion.
84 See Kennedy, supra note 44, at 1784, 1816; see also CARTER, supra note 42, at 27
(arguing that blacks should insist on an affirmative action "that rewrites the standards for
excellence, rather than one that trains us to meet them").
85 A story I often tell about myself is that when I was interviewing for a law teaching
job, a dean looked at my resume during our interview and said, "I see you do feminist
theory. Do you do anything else?" He had apparently erased everything from my resume
except my work in feminist theory and had apparently not valued the feminist theory highly.
When I was later considered for a position at that law school, I was told that some members
of the faculty had openly discussed that it was a plus that I was a woman. I would have
preferred the faculty to have had a discussion as to why they needed a specialist in feminist
theory on their faculty and why I was the most appropriate person to fill that need. It was
easier to talk about me as a generic woman than to discuss the specific assets I could bring
to the faculty in part because, as a woman, I had developed an expertise in feminist theory.
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demonstrate how their life experiences have been negatively influenced by their
race. Ultimately, however, I believe that my argument is more respectful than
the status quo because it recognizes the diversity of life experiences that exists
within the so-called black community. In fact, I think it would undermine the
validity of affirmative action if the children of New Orleans Mayor Marc
Morial (a very light-skinned black who is also upper-class and the son of a
previous mayor) received the same affirmative treatment as a dark-skinned
black who has grown up in the New Orleans housing projects on welfare.
Moreover, my argument should help darker-skinned blacks by not allowing
authorities to achieve a racially balanced workforce by only hiring lighter-
skinned blacks or multiracial individuals. Under our present classification
system, Naomi Zack is as black as a recent black immigrant from South Africa.
It is time that we recognize the cultural differences that may exist between these
two groups8 6 in fashioning an effective affirmative action program for the
neediest people in our society.
Nonetheless, I do not want to go too far with my argument. As I said
earlier, I do believe that the role model theory (rationale number three) is a
valid rationale for affirmative action in certain settings. For example, I believe
that it does make sense in the educational context to say that all of our students
benefit from seeing blacks and women serve as competent teachers and role
models.8 7 And, in fact, it may be particularly important to hire such role
models in areas of the curriculum in which women and blacks have been
historically underrepresented, such as commercial law.88 Redefining merit,
therefore, to recognize fields such as African-American studies or women's
studies will not do enough to integrate women and blacks into a faculty if they
are concentrated only in a small number of fields.
The role model theory could also benefit from a redefinition of merit. It is
typical, for example, in the educational context for women and racial minorities
86 Of course, in some situations, a light-skinned black may prove to be more deserving
of affirmative action than a darker-skinned black immigrant from Africa. I am not
suggesting a perfect correlation between skin color and privilege; I am simply suggesting
that we recognize the complexities of the black experience when determining who may be
most worthy of affirmative treatment.
87 The United States Supreme Court rejected the role model theory in Wygant v.
Jackson Board of Education, 476 U.S. 267, 275 (1986) (finding that role model theory has
no "logical stopping point").
88 Similarly, we probably need to value the work that men do in feminist theory and
whites do in civil rights, because men doing feminist theory work and whites doing civil
rights work may help our students move beyond their stereotypes about who can do that
kind of work. Thus, Jack Greenberg should be valued for his civil rights work in part
because he helps send a message to whites that it is not only blacks who need to be
concerned about civil rights.
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to serve an enhanced advising function on a faculty because of their
underrepresentation in comparison with the student body. At tenure time,
however, the qualifications for tenure usually focus primarily on scholarship
with some attention to classroom teaching. Hours spent inside or outside of the
office advising students or attending functions are usually not included in the
definition of merit for tenure. If we are going to embrace the role model theory
in our affirmative action programs, then we have a responsibility to the
individuals that we hire to value the work they do in the community as good
role models.
Finally, even if we embrace the first rationale for affirmative action, there
may be contexts in which individualized inquiries are unnecessary because the
legacy of racist treatment is so obvious. For example, a majority of the
Supreme Court refused to acknowledge the history of subordination against
blacks in the city of Richmond, "the cradle of the Old Confederacy," when it
overturned its affirmative action program in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co.89 Because racism is a group experience, defined by an actor's prejudice
based on that group membership, one can never define racism entirely on an
individualized basis. All I am suggesting is that sometimes racism is visited
upon individuals in varying degrees. When we have limited resources and want
to use those resources to overcome that group-based experience of
subordination, we should use those resources as effectively as possible.
Devoting those resources preferentially to the individuals who we can identify
as having been the most unfortunate victims of racism makes sense. But even
as we make those individualized decisions of who within the category of
"black" is most deserving of affirmative action, we should not lose sight of the
fact that racism is a group-based experience. Nearly all of the individuals
within the category "black" may be more deserving of ameliorative treatment
than nearly all of the individuals within the category "white," yet the black-
white difference should not obscure the differences among the individuals
within the group "black." Moreover, we may want to develop some rules to
guard against subjectivity undermining the entire process. As I will discuss in
Part V of this Article, we can learn about constructing individualized models
by considering how they have been developed in the disabilities context. We do
not have to entirely throw out all considerations of group-based experiences to
improve upon them by including individualized aspects.
2. Transracial Adoptions
The National Association of Black Social Workers (NABSW) has strongly
influenced our adoption and placement policies through its 1972 position paper
89 See 488 U.S. 469, 561 (1989) (Blackmun, I., dissenting).
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in which it strongly argued against the adoption of black children by white
families. 90 Although the NABSW may have made an important contribution to
our understanding of the best interests of black children seeking family
placement, it has also perpetuated stark black-white thinking about society. Its
position paper states, "Our society is distinctly black or white and characterized
by white racism at every level. We repudiate the fallacious and fantasied
reasoning of some that whites adopting Black children will alter that basic
character." 91 Unfortunately, in trying to protect the interests of black children,
the NABSW ignored the interests of the growing number of mixed-race
children by assuming that we can easily divide society into black and white
categories.
The NABSW position paper has generated extensive discussion on the
topic of transracial adoptions. 92 Authors generally debate whether blacks face
cultural genocide if black children are made available for adoption by white
couples, or whether black children suffer so much from the foster care system
that they are better off placed with a white family than allowed to languish in
that system. In general, authors seem to recognize the cultural benefits of
placing black children with black families, but often also recognize the practical
difficulties that make such placements difficult.
These authors tend to be concerned about preserving black culture and
serving the best interests of black children, but they give little attention to how
we define "black." In particular, they ignore that many children available for
adoption are mixed-race, rather than exclusively white or black.93 Mixed-race
90 Forde-Mazrui, supra note 43, at 925-26.
91 Id. at 926 (quoting NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BLACK SOCIAL WORKERs, POsmIoN
PAPER (Summer 1973)).
92 See, e.g., 1o Beth Eubanks, Transracial Adoption in Texas: Should the Best Interests
Standard Be Color-Blind, 24 ST. MARY'S L.. 1225 (1993); Zanita E. Fenton, In a World
Not Their Own: The Adoption of Black Odildren, 10 HARv. BLACKLEnE 1. 39 (1993);
Forde-Mazrui, supra note 43; Timothy P. Glynn, The Role of Race in Adoption
Proceedings: A Constitutional Critique of the Minnesota Preference Statute, 77 MNN. L.
REV. 925 (1993); Joan Mahoney, The Black Baby Doll: Transradal Adoption and Cultural
Preservation, 59 UMKC L. REV. 487 (1991); Twila L. Perry, Race and Odild Placement:
The Best Interests Test and the Cost of Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L. 51 (1990-91).
93 Although I have not seen figures on the number of mixed-race children available for
adoption, it appears that the number of such children is increasing. The number of black-
white interracial marriages increased from 65,000 in 1970 to 218,000 in 1988. Perry, supra
note 92, at 52 n.4. In 1984, there were approximately one million mixed-race children in
the United States. Kathi Overmier, Biracial Adolescents: Areas of Conflict in Identity
Foration, 14 1. APPLIED SOC. Sci. 157, 158 (1990); see also Sandor, supra note 16, at 39
(presenting statistics on interracial births).
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children 94 are usually lumped into the category "black" with the assumption
that steps need to be taken to preserve their black heritage, without considering
whether we are using family law to create rather than to preserve cultural
heritage.95 In other words, when we assume that all mixed-race children should
be treated as if they are black in the context of family placements, we are
sending the message that these children should be classified and treated as if
they are black.
The fact that commentators generally ignore in discussing the adoption of
multiracial children is what the family composition of these children would be
absent adoption. In many of the reported cases of multiracial children, the
biological mother is white and the biological father (who is not the mother's
husband) is black.96 Given our socially constructed system of childrearing, the
child most likely would have been raised in a white household absent adoption.
Ironically, when we classify the mixed-race child as black and place him or her
in a black family, we transport the child to a different family situation than he
or she would have experienced absent adoption. Although some commentators
consider transracial adoptions to be cultural genocide for black children, they
ignore the difficulty in making a cultural genocide argument when multiracial
children with white biological mothers are placed in white families. By lumping
together all children with at least one biological black parent into the category
"black" for adoption purposes, we help construct a larger category of "black"
than would exist absent adoption. 97
In one case, Reisman v. Tennessee Department of Human Services,98 the
court recognized the "bi-racial" background of a child and concluded that "bi-
racial children shall be placed in foster homes and in adoptive homes with bi-
94 By the term "mixed-race children," I will be referring to children who are part
black and part white because that is the most common example of mixed race discussed by
the courts. Interestingly, I have found no cases involving, for example, a child with a
F-ispanic parent and a black parent, although that combination is probably not unusual. It
seems that racial classification issues most frequently arise when the child is white and
black, which probably reflects our culture's preoccupation with the purity of the white race.
95 See, e.g., Farmer v. Farmer, 439 N.Y.S.2d 584 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981); In re Davis,
465 A.2d 614 (Pa. 1983); Ward v. Ward, 216 P.2d 755 (Wash. 1950).
96 See, e.g., Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of Family and Children's Servs., 547
F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. dended, 437 U.S. 910 (1978); Reisman v. Tennessee Dep't
of Human Servs., 843 F. Supp. 356 (W.D. Tenn. 1993).
97 The literature on the construction of race typically argues that white society has
unilaterally defined the category "black." See, e.g., Gotanda, supra note 21. Nonetheless,
the labeling of mixed-race children in the adoption context has not occurred exclusively by
white society. Some members of the black community have insisted on considering mixed-
race children to be black for adoption purposes. See, e.g., Fenton, supra note 92.
98 843 F. Supp. 356.
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racial families if possible." 99 But the court never defines exactly what it means
by "bi-racial families." Ordinarily, if no adoption takes place and the nuclear
family stays intact, a mixed-race child is raised by parents of two different
races-I will assume white and black for this discussion. Those parents do not
have the same racial makeup as the child who is half white and half black. The
only way that child would share the racial makeup of her parents is if the
parents were each half white and half black (a possible but not very likely
result). In what sense, one must wonder, is it better for a mixed-race child to
have parents of two different races rather than two parents of the same race? In
neither case does the child really fully share her racial heritage with her
parents. 10o
The court's use of its term "bi-racial" also does not seem to appreciate that
nearly all blacks and many whites are of mixed-race background in the United
States.10 1 The term "bi-racial," as used by the court, seems to be limited to the
situation in which a child has a white and a black parent. What happens, one
must wonder, when the adoptive child grows up and bears a child? She was a
99 Id. at 361-63, 365 (discussing "bi-racial culture" and making legal conclusions). In
Dnmwond, 547 F.2d 835, the social service agency appears to have belatedly
acknowledged the adoptive child's mixed-race heritage when, after removing him from the
white family with whom he had lived happily for two years, it attempted at least two
placements with mixed-race couples, one of which was apparently unsuccessful, before he
had reached the age of five. Larry I. Palmer, Adoption: A Plea for Realistic Constitutional
Dealsiomnaking, 11 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 1, 7 (1979). The agency's belated
recognition of the child's mixed-race heritage accentuated "foster care drift," but did little
for the well-being of the child. Randall Kennedy has called race-conscious placements such
as the one in Drunnond "scandalous." Kennedy, supra note 44, at 1818 n.305.
100 Moreover, it is not unusual in our society for a child to be raised by one parent. A
mixed-race child who is raised by one parent will therefore often be raised by a white
parent or a black parent, but not by a mixed-race couple. Accordingly, a mixed-race couple
adoption rule often does not replicate the family structure that that child would have had in
the absence of adoption.
101 As Professor Harris notes,
It is not at all clear that even the slaves imported from abroad represented "pure Negro
races." ... [Miany of the tribes imported from Africa had intermingled with peoples of
the Mediterranean, among them Portuguese slave traders. Other slaves brought to the
United States came via the West Indies, where some Africans had been brought
directly, but still others had been brought via Spain and Portugal, countries in which
extensive interracial sexual relations had occurred. By the mid-nineteenth century it
was, therefore, a virtual fiction to speak of "pure blood" as it relates to racial
identification in the United States.
Harris, supra note 29, at 1740 n.141.
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"bi-racial" child who grew up in a white household. If she bears a child with a
white man, is her child still "bi-racial"? What if she bears a child with a black
man? Is the child still "bi-racial" or will social convention cause the child to be
considered black?. The "bi-racial" category, as used by the court and
commentators, seems to reflect only the situation in which a child is exactly
fifty percent white and fifty percent black. It is not a term that reflects a
spectrum; it simply designates a new point-the middle-on the bipolar racial
scale. Ironically, that middle point probably does not even exist in the cases to
which it is being applied, because the parent who is labeled "black" probably is
the product of a mixed-race heritage. Thus, although it might make sense
abstractly to recognize the category "bi-racial" and use that category to find
homes for "bi-racial" children, the category is actually an unworkable one.
Nearly all of us are, in fact, multiracial, and it distorts reality further to
consider only the child with one white and one black parent to be in a middle
category.
These classification questions are challenging because the courts do not
define the race of a child in a vacuum. The fact that a court recognizes a child
as mixed-race will not necessarily cause society to treat the child as mixed-race.
Society may still choose to treat the child as if she is black. If a court, for
example, insists on giving no racial preference to black parents over white
parents in the adoption of a mixed-race child, and the child is eventually placed
with white parents, the child may still face unfavorable treatment by friends,
classmates, teachers, employers, and health care workers who consider the
child to be black. Some people may therefore argue that we should try to place
the mixed-race child with a black family so that the child will learn how to deal
with a racist society. 102 But such a preferential policy makes the assumption
that the best way to learn to deal with society's classification scheme is to adopt
it as part of one's self-identity. That presumption is a dangerous because it puts
the courts and social service agencies in the position of helping to perpetuate an
arbitrary classification system. While some people may consider such a racial
classification system in the adoption context to be ameliorative, it also helps
perpetuate the subordinating "one drop of blood" rule for racial classification. I
am therefore suggesting that racial preference policies for adoption of mixed-
race children do not present exactly the same problems as they do for black
children. Classifying a mixed-race child as black and thereby preferentially
placing her in a black home promotes a racist and subordinating classification
system.
In sum, I believe that we get a different perspective on the transracial
adoption controversy when we examine it in the context of a multiracial child.
First, we see that many of the children whom the courts and social agencies
102 See, e.g., Fenton, supra note 92, at 60-61.
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have unreflexively labeled "black" for adoption purposes are in fact
multiracial. 103 It is therefore too simplistic to say that these cases raise issues of
transracial adoption only when a white couple or individual tries to adopt a
multiracial child. Second, we see that our goal should be to respect an
individual's full racial heritage, rather than to distort one aspect of it. When
courts or social agencies distort one aspect of that racial heritage, they help
perpetuate our racist "one drop of blood" rule. Nonetheless, just as we should
stop transferring what is considered by some commentators to be good social
policy for black children to the context of multiracial children, we should also
be careful not to transfer these lessons from cases involving multiracial children
to cases involving black children. Our policy of preferring black parents for a
black child may be beneficial in terms of preserving racial heritage and even
teaching a child how to deal with the racism of our society. 14 My point is
simply that stretching that policy to include all multiracial children with a drop
of African-American blood reinforces racism, rather than the best interests of
the child. By taking that step, we are helping to construct a bipolar racial model
that is disrespectful to the genuine mixed racial heritage of that child. Children
should not be the instruments of such social engineering.
How then could we really move toward a spectrum of race rather than false
polarities? I would suggest that we begin by truly investigating our racial
heritage. The assumption would be that each of us is of mixed racial heritage,
and the challenge would be to fully discover our own family trees. If the child
in the Reisman case, for example, could be determined to have ancestry from
Africa, Europe, and North America, then we could hope that that child would
be taught to honor and value that mixed racial heritage. It is wrong to assume,
however, that only parents who share a child's identical racial background
103 In talking to my friends who have engaged in what are commonly described as
transracial adoptions, I have been struck by how many of them indicate that the biological
mother was white and the biological father was black. In one case, a friend, who is an
adoptive mother, told me that the white biological mother of her adoptive daughter had two
children by the same black man to whom she was not married. One of the children was dark
and the other was light. The mother relinquished only the darker child for adoption. My
friend, however, who was considered to have engaged in a transracial adoption, shared
many physical characteristics with the biological mother who would have otherwise raised
the child as a single parent. I believe that the term "transracial adoption" is a misnomer in
that context, because the child was transferred from one white mother to another white
mother. Although it is important for the white mother in this context to fully respect the
child's racial heritage, there is no reason for her to face a higher burden to qualify for
adoption because of the purportedly transracial nature of the adoption.
104 Since my argument is premised on the need to engage in more individualized
understandings of our racial heritage, I do not have sufficient information to know how
important it may be to some or many black children to have black adoptive parents.
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would try to honor and respect the child's racial heritage. Outside the adoption
context, adults who marry someone of another race and bear children with that
person routinely raise children who are of mixed race. We expect them to
honor and respect a heritage to which they do not directly belong. By sending
the mixed-race child to only a mixed-race household, we attempt to do the
impossible-give each child parents with racial backgrounds identical to the
child's own. That result does not always occur outside the adoption context,
and there is no reason to artificially force it into the adoption context.
A problem with this thesis is that much African heritage was lost through
forced deportation and enslavement. Whereas many people of European
heritage can trace their families back to a specific country, many people of
African heritage cannot do this because of the coercive nature of their voyage
to the United States. Africa is a large continent, and it is unfortunate when a
child cannot trace his or her heritage back to a specific country or region on
that continent. For the child of African heritage, the task of tracing back
ancestry may become a lesson in the trials of forced enslavement. And, for a
mixed-race child, it may lead "a descendant to an irreconcilable slave and
slave-owning genealogy." 10 5 As we begin to acknowledge the category of
"mixed-race," we may also take the opportunity to break down the monolithic
category of "Africa" and discuss the many countries on that continent. Such
discussions not only may help children of African heritage to learn more about
their heritage, but may also help all of us to move beyond our monolithic
thinking about Africa.
A final difficulty in the adoption context is confidentiality. Children who
are adopted always have special problems in tracing their heritage because of
the confidentiality of the adoption proceedings. Nonetheless, if their racial
heritage is to be meaningfully honored and respected, it would seem important
for the adoption agency to collect as much information as possible while the
birth mother and father may be known to it. Rather than classifying a child as
black or mixed-race, it would be helpful to learn as much as possible about
what kind of African or other heritage the child may have. If this information is
105 Zack has therefore argued,
[lt is now clear that the form of black family history is inherently problematic in
comparison with the form of white family history. Not only does black family history
contain self-undermining recollections of being oppressed, but its racial diversity may
lead a descendant to an irreconcilable slave and slave-owning genealogy. If one would
liberate oneself through identification by means of family history, one may also have to
liberate one's ancestors.
ZAcK, supra note 72, at 65.
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communicated to the adoptive parents, then they can try more faithfully to learn
about that heritage and to embue in the child a sense of pride about that
heritage.
Thus, a more individualized approach could create better social policy in
the contexts of affirmative action and transracial adoption. Pragmatically, we
may need to retain the use of some group-based categories in the affirmative
action context to meet goals other than remedying a history of subordination. In
the adoption context, however, it is hard to see any need for group-based rules.
Adoption, by definition, is a highly individualized process to which we devote
considerable social resources. There is no excuse for social agencies and courts
to blindly perpetuate the "one drop of blood" rule without fully investigating
the best interests of the child.
ImI. SEXUAL ORIENTATION
The term "bisexual" is rarely recognized by courts and legislatures. This
lack of recognition causes serious difficulties for courts and legislatures because
they often want to disqualify or penalize the "true homosexual" from various
jobs and opportunities, but do not necessarily want to disqualify or penalize
everyone who has had a same-sex sexual experience. By only seeing sexual
experiences as bipolar, rather than on a continuum, they often have serious
definitional problems concerning individuals who have had sexual experiences
with members of both sexes.
In this part of the Article, I will first survey the definitions that have been
used to accord punitive treatment on the basis of sexual orientation. In some
cases, these definitional schemes show that society saves its strongest
disapproval for those individuals who identify as "true homosexuals" and never
move toward the bi categories. In other cases, however, we will see that
commentators save their sharpest disapproval for bisexuals they believe could
(and should) "choose" to engage exclusively in heterosexual activity. "True
homosexuals," by contrast, get their sympathy because they cannot "stop
themselves." Because of the element of choice that is perceived to exist in this
context, we will see varying assessments of how we should treat individuals in
the bi category, although predominantly, it is fair to say that social policies
have targeted the "true homosexual" for the most substantial punitive
measures.
After surveying our definitional schemes, I will then consider how we
could develop ameliorative policies on the basis of sexual orientation.
Increasingly, society is trying to develop policies which will enable gay,
lesbian, and bisexual people to obtain the benefits previously limited to married
heterosexuals. It may soon even be possible to argue for affirmative action on
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the basis of sexual orientation. This movement requires us to begin to develop
benign or ameliorative definitional categories. Who should be counted? How
should the appropriate category be defined for benign or ameliorative
purposes? Should bisexuals be included? It is important to think about these
questions now, rather than in a reactive, urgent mode at a later time.
A. Negative Categorization
1. The Military
The military's awkward definitional scheme for the purpose of discharging
the "true homosexual" has been widely discussed elsewhere, 106 but deserves
brief mention. Until recently, the military could decide to retain a "known
homosexual" if the following conditions were met:
A member of the armed forces shall be separated from the armed forces under
regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Defense if one or more of the
following findings is made and approved in accordance with procedures set
forth in such regulations:
(1) That the member has engaged in, attempted to engage in, or further
findings, made and approved in accordance with procedures set forth
in such regulations, that the member has demonstrated that-
(A) such conduct is a departure from the member's usual and
customary behavior,
(B) such conduct, under all the circumstances, is unlikely to recur;
(C) such conduct was not accomplished by use of force, coercion,
intimidation;
(D) under the particular circumstances of the case, the member's
continued presence in the armed forces is consistent with the
interests of the armed forces in proper discipline, good order,
and morale; and
(E) the member does not have a propensity or intent to engage in
homosexual acts. 107
This regulation attempted to protect the practicing bisexual who was willing to
express disdain for his or her same-sex sexual activity. Since the military
apparently believed that a person was either homosexual or heterosexual,
stating a proclivity for heterosexual sexual experiences was probably sufficient
to avoid discharge. But the "true homosexual" who had no proclivity for
106 See, e.g., Judith H. Stiehm, Managing the Military's Homosexual Exclusion
Policy: Text and Subtext, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 685 (1992) (describing how the military's
exclusion of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals has changed over time).
107 10 U.S.C.A. § 654(b) (West Supp. 1994).
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heterosexual sexual activity was at grave risk for discharge.
2. New Hampshire
A more interesting and less discussed example of definitional problems in
the sexual orientation area is that of the State of New Hampshire. In 1987, the
House of Representatives of the State of New Hampshire decided that it wanted
to exclude homosexuals from being adoptive or foster parents, as well as day
care workers. 108 In order to create this exclusion, it had to define who was a
homosexual. The definition that the state legislature created states, "[A]
homosexual is defined as any person who performs or submits to any sexual act
involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth or anus of another
person of the same gender ... ."109
This definition divided people into two stark categories: heterosexual or
homosexual. Any act of same-sex sexual activity made a person homosexual.
Moreover, homosexuality was defined exclusively on the basis of sexual
experience. A celibate homosexual did not exist.
The New Hampshire House of Representatives was nonetheless concerned
about the constitutionality of such a statute. Pursuant to the New Hampshire
Constitution's rules regarding advisory opinions, it sought advice from the
New Hampshire Supreme Court.110
The New Hampshire Supreme Court (including David Souter) advised the
state legislature that this bill would be constitutional in the adoption and foster
care settings, but that it swept too broadly in the day care setting.11 In
determining the constitutionality of the bill, the court, however, was troubled
by the definition of homosexuality. It stated, "This very narrow definition of
homosexual behavior contains no requirement that the acts or submission
thereto be uncoerced, nor does there appear to be any temporal limitation
regarding when the acts are to have occurred." 112 Because the court believed
that the statute swept too broadly in defining homosexuality, it decided to
assume that the homosexual acts had to be voluntary and knowing." 3
Moreover, the court created this temporal rule:
[W]e interpret the definition's present tense usage to mean that the acts
1 In re Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21, 22 (N.H. 1987) (describing New
Hampshire H.R. 70).
109 Id. (quoting New Hampshire H.R. Res. 32).
110 Id. at 21-22 (quoting New Hampshire H.R. Res. 23).
"III1. at 25.
112 Id at24.
113 Id.
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bringing an individual within the definition's ambit must be or have been
committed or submitted to on a current basis reasonably close in time to the
filing of an application for licensure or a petition for adoption. This
interpretation thus excludes from the definition of homosexual those persons
who, for example, had one homosexual experience during adolescence, but
who now engage in exclusively heterosexual behavior. 114
This commentary by the state supreme court was an attempt to narrow the
New Hampshire definition to include only the "true homosexual." A young
person who engaged in homosexual activity could be excluded from the
definition based on the combination of the coercion and timing exceptions.
Because the event had occurred in the distant past, one did not have to consider
this event to be indicative of the individual's current identification. The fact that
the event had not recurred might even be evidence that the individual was
repulsed by such activity. Moreover, if the individual could allege coercion,
then the label "homosexual" would not apply at all.
In 1987, after the New Hampshire Supreme Court issued its advisory
opinion, the state legislature amended existing statutes to prohibit homosexuals
from adopting children and from becoming foster parents. 115 It used the
following definition of homosexuality: "any person who knowingly and
voluntarily performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of
one person and the mouth or anus of another person of the same gender." 116
The legislature therefore chose to explicitly impose the requirement that the
sexual behavior be knowing and voluntary, but it did not explicitly impose a
temporal requirement. It retained the present tense usage, but left open the
question of how recently one would have had to engage in a homosexual act to
be deemed a homosexual. Would the act have had to occur during the previous
day, the previous week, the previous year, or the previous decade? All of these
interpretations are awkward because they require a past tense interpretation of
the statutes. Certainly the legislature did not mean to require that the person be
engaging in a homosexual sexual act while being interviewed about his or her
suitability to parent!
Although the legislature was alerted to the ambiguity problem with respect
to timing, it did nothing to solve the problem. 117 It continued to believe that it
114 Id.
115 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 161:2(1Y), 170-B:4 (1994). Based on the court's
advisory opinion, it dropped the ban on homosexuals working as day care workers.
116 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 161:2(), 170-B:2(XV) (1994).
117 The ambiguity problem did not end with this case. Foster parents unsuccessfully
challenged the new rules on grounds of ambiguity. See Stuart v. State Div. of Children and
Youth Servs., 597 A.2d 1076 (N.H. 1991). The foster parents unsuccessfully argued that
they could not certify that there were no homosexuals in their household because the
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could achieve its intended purpose with such a definition by neatly dividing the
world into categories of "true homosexual" and the normal heterosexual.
Why did the state not come up with a better definition to achieve its
purpose? Arguably, the state deliberately wanted to exclude all individuals from
being adoptive or foster parents who had ever had a homosexual experience at
any time in their lives. Thus, it deliberately kept the language broad. But
because the state supreme court rejected that possibility as overbroad, it is
reasonable to assume that that is not what the legislature intended.
The one modification that the legislature did devise may illuminate its
intentions. The legislature created an exception for people who could claim that
their homosexual experiences were not engaged in voluntarily or knowingly.
Although the legislature may not believe that many people have had
homosexual experiences, it apparently did believe that many people have had
coerced homosexual experiences. In other words, it was more important to
provide an exception for coercion than to provide an exception for the passage
of time. The legislature may have believed that its exception was sufficiently
broad, because it accepted the stereotype that adolescent homosexual
experiences tend to be the result of coercion by an older gay man. Thus, a
temporal exception would not be needed because it would be redundant with a
coercion exception.
In sum, the State of New Hampshire initially created a legal disability for
homosexuals without considering how hard it might be to define the "true
homosexual." When confronted with definitional difficulties by a state supreme
court that largely accepted its political and moral agenda, the legislature did not
budge very much. It revised its definition to better include only the "true
homosexual" by allowing an individual with homosexual experiences to argue
that he or she was blameless because the experiences had been coerced or
unknowing. Because no proof is required to establish coercion, one can also
understand the legislature as having created an exception for people who are
willing to repudiate their past homosexual experiences as coercive rather than
consensual. These individuals would therefore not be the "true homosexual"
who openly acknowledges his or her sexual orientation.
In the State of New Hampshire, therefore, a "true homosexual" is someone
who has engaged in same-sex sexual activity and will not express regret
concerning those experiences by claiming that they were coercive. The State of
New Hampshire did not intend to exclude all individuals who had engaged in
same-sex sexual experiences from being adoptive or foster parents. It only
intended to exclude those individuals who felt positively about their same-sex
sexual partners. A closeted, self-deprecating homosexual is considered to be a
more appropriate parent than an open, proud homosexual. The State of New
definition of homosexuality in the statute was so vague. Id.
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Hampshire, like the military, seems to prefer self-deprecating homosexuals
who might be able to hide behind their bisexuality to open, gay, and proud
homosexuals.
3. Sodomy Laws
One final example shows that social policies do not always target the "true
homosexual" for mistreatment; sometimes, bisexuals can be the central target.
Professors Arthur Murphy and John Eilington have written a law review article
in which they try to find some middle ground in the gay rights debate. 118
Ironically, in their search for a middle ground, they propose blatant
discrimination against the middle-bisexuals! They suggest that existing
sodomy laws be modified to make it illegal to engage in sexual intercourse by
mouth or anus with another person of the same sex, unless the accused can
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the individual with whom he or
she had sex was "reasonably believed by the accused to be a true
homosexual." 119 A "true homosexual" is defined as an individual whose
"sexual orientation is predominantly towards persons of the same sex as
himself or herself." 120 They realize that an individual who has sex with a
bisexual would be subject to legal sanction, but justify that decision by arguing
that it is permissible to direct the bisexual to "make a choice":
The only people whom the statute inevitably frustrates are those (rare?)
bisexuals who are powerfully, equally attracted to both men and women-the
truly "double gaited" in Damon Runyon's phrase. But as the majority of the
justices recognized in Bowers, a state may define and proscribe deviant
behavior in its pursuit of secular morality. A state may frustrate a bisexual's
desire for homosexual intercourse just as it may frustrate any adult's libidinal
hankering for a fifteen year old Lolita, a close adult relative, a prostitute or a
willing animal. 12 1
Murphy and Ellington's proposal is interesting because it openly condemns
bisexuals (while tolerating the "true homosexual") and turns the New
Hampshire perspective on its head. While the legislature in New Hampshire is
determined to impose legal sanction on the "true homosexual," Murphy and
Ellington are determined to provide limited protection to the "true
homosexual" while proscribing the same-sex conduct of the "true bisexual."
118 Arthur A. Murphy & John P. Ellington, Homosexuality and the Law: Tolerance
and Contmnment H, 97 DicK. L. REv. 693 (1993).
119 Id. app. A at 709.
120 Id. app. at 709-10.
121 Id. at 698. (footnotes omitted).
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Their comments reveal that, to some people, bisexuals are the most threatening
category, whereas to other people, "true homosexuals" are the most
threatening. In either case, social policy is created to try to conform human
behavior to a set of arbitrary norms.
In sum, social policies act coercively to construct individuals' sexuality.
These classifications substantially affect people's lives. Children who could be
adopted by loving and committed homosexual parents in New Hampshire and
elsewhere are languishing in foster care. The quality of our military is eroded
through open acceptance of homophobia. Gay and lesbian people are routinely
denied family rights and other benefits because of their "illegal" lifestyle.
These definitions are not simply irrational attempts to classify human behavior
and identity, but are powerful mechanisms to perpetuate the subordination of
gay, lesbian, and bisexual people in society. And unfortunately, instead of
consistently arguing for the elimination of these debilitating categories, some
authors such as Murphy and Ellington are arguing for the creation of yet new
debilitating categories. 122
B. Positive Categorization: Affirmative Action
Affirmative action is not usually discussed in the context of gay rights.
Generally, the gay rights movement is silent about affirmative action out of fear
that the Christian Right will use such talk as an excuse to undermine efforts to
achieve more basic nondiscrimination. 123 Nonetheless, some authors have
begun to tentatively speak about affirmative action for the gay and lesbian
community, and some institutions have even begun to implement affirmative
action programs on the basis of sexual orientation. 124
122 Murphy and Ellington are not alone in proposing new initiatives to penalize gay,
lesbian, and bisexual people. Recent initiatives in Oregon, Colorado, and elsewhere have
tried to repeal the minimal nondiscrimination advances made by gay, lesbian, and bisexual
people in the last 25 years. See Ud apps. B-C at 710-11 (Oregon and Colorado initiatives).
123 See Jeffrey S. Byrne & Bruce R. Deming, On the Prudence of Discussing
Affmative Actionfor Lesbians and Gay Men.: Community, Strategy, and Equality, 5 STAN.
L. & POL'Y REv. 177, 179 (1993). Proposed federal legislation to create nondiscrimination
protection on the basis of sexual orientation explicitly prohibits affirmative action. See
S. 2238, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 6(b) (1994) (sponsored by Senator Kennedy) ("A covered
entity shall not give preferential treatment to an individual on the basis of sexual
orientation."). If this bill became law, the institutions that have publicly announced use of
affirmative action for lesbians and gay men would presumably be in violation of the law.
124 See Byrne, supra note 13; Byrne & Dening, supra note 123. Northeastern
University has also recently announced an affirmative action program for lesbians and gay
men. See Alice Dembner, Northeastern Takes Steps to Hire More Gays, BOSTON GLOBE,
June 28, 1994, at 20; Glen Johnson, University Starts Recruiting Gay Faculty, RECORD,
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Because of the expected controversial nature of how to implement
affirmative action on the basis of sexual orientation, it is very important that we
have a sound argument for how and why to implement such a program. A good
place to begin in having such a discussion is to determine why we consider an
affirmative action policy to be appropriate. Jeffrey Byrne and Bruce Deming
justify such a policy by reference to the history of disadvantage faced by gay
and lesbian people. Nonetheless, there is no monolithic treatment on the basis
of sexual orientation, as Byme and Deming acknowledge in the following
statement:
For gay and lesbian people qua gays and lesbians, nondiscrimination may
more effectively deliver the promise of substantive equality. We are raised as
presumptively heterosexual members of families belonging to every race,
religion, and socioeconomic class, and as Representative Barney Frank
explains, "have not on the whole in this country suffered the kind of systematic
discrimination in the allocation of educational resources that have affected
other groups." Neither are our economic opportunities and social mobility as a
group as systematically circumscribed as are those of African Americans and
other groups.125
This important acknowledgement furthers my general argument in this
Article about how the first rationale for affirmative action (disadvantage) should
be implemented. It may be the case that some gay, lesbian, or bisexual people
have been largely shielded from the effects of prejudice. On the other hand, it
may be the case that an individual gay, lesbian, or bisexual individual has faced
dramatic discrimination that has disadvantaged him or her in an educational
institution or workplace. 126 He or she should be entitled to tell that story
June 27, 1994, at A6. Nonetheless, some institutions have tried to distance themselves from
suggestions that they engage in affirmative action on the basis of sexual orientation. See,
e.g., Anthony Flint & Kay Longcope, Kennedy School Shows Caution on Gay Initiative,
BosToN GLOBE, Feb. 28, 1991, at 25 (reporting on school spokesperson's statement that
institution does not recruit or admit students, staff, or faculty on the basis of sexual
orientation despite a report recommendation that the institution engage in affirmative gay
and lesbian recruitment).
125 Byme & Deming, supra note 123, at 185.
126 For example, a friend of mine in college was cut off from her family both
economically and emotionally after she "came out" to them. Her grades suffered that
semester as she dealt with this traumatic event. Amazingly, her grades rebounded in the
next semester as she developed positive strategies to deal with this problem. When she
applied to graduate school, it would have been nice if she could have felt comfortable
asking an admissions officer to discount that one semester's grades. By contrast, because my
family was always very supportive of my sexual preferences, I could not say, when
applying to graduate school, that my participation in the gay, lesbian, and bisexual
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irrespective of how characteristic it is of all gays, lesbians, or bisexuals. The
role model thesis, by contrast, would allow more group-based rather than
individualized thinking. 127
To further complicate the problem of individuality, we have to grapple
with the problem of definitions. Who should be entitled to affirmative action
protection? Should bisexuals, for example, be included? Little attention has
been given to how to define the beneficiary group, in the sexual orientation
context. One law firm has defined it as "self-identified gay men and lesbians,"
whereas another institution has defined it as "declared gay men, lesbians, and
bisexuals." 128 Jeffrey Byrne, the only author that I have found who discusses
how we should define the beneficiary group, argues that we should include
bisexuals along with lesbians and gay men. He says, "[B]isexual persons have
suffered oppression and invisibility such that the justifications articulated for
affirmative action for lesbians and gay men warrant inclusion of bisexual
persons in the beneficiary group. In particular, bisexual women and men face
the same widespread societal and employment discrimination faced by lesbians
and gay men." 129
Byrne makes his argument for the purpose of extending protection of gay
men and lesbians to bisexuals, but I believe his argument actually helps
demonstrate the flaws in his basic categorization scheme. Bisexual individuals
vary widely in terms of what that category means to them.130 Individual F who
community detracted from my grades. If a school had an affirmative action policy, I would
argue that my friend, and not myself, would be entitled to that affirmative treatment. By
contrast, I had a very unpleasant academic experience with a math professor who told me
directly that he did not expect "girls" to excel in math and would therefore not answer my
questions outside the classroom. Because he was also chair of the department, his attitude
did deter me from continuing in math (previously my strongest subject). Had I applied to
graduate school in math, I believe it would have been appropriate for me to ask a committee
to understand the gaps in my math studies caused by my decision to forego further classes
with this professor. My friend, who majored in the humanities, by contrast, had no overt
experiences of sexism (that she shared with me) stemming from her gender; so, it would not
have been appropriate to ask a graduate admissions committee to consider her gender when
reviewing her application for graduate school. Of course, this example only speaks to the
first justification for affirmative action-helping individuals overcome societal disadvantage.
Other affirmative action rationales, such as increasing the role models for members of the
gay and lesbian community, may have made it appropriate for both my roommate and
myself to receive affirmative treatment in our chosen professions.
127 See Byrne, supra note 13, at 69-70, 77-78 (acknowledging importance of role
model theory).
12 8 kd at92.
12 9 Id. at 93.
13 0 See generally Ruth Colker, A Bisexual Jurispndence, 3 LAW & SEXUALrrY:
REviEW OF LESBIAN AND GAY LEGAL IssuEs 127 (1993).
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has had exclusive relationships with someone of the same sex may consider
herself to be bisexual, along with individual G who is married to someone of
the opposite sex and has never been sexually involved with someone of the
same sex. Individual H may have recently had relationships with individuals of
both sexes. For those three categories of people, the meaning of their sexual
orientation might be entirely different in their lives. Individual F may have
suffered extensive discrimination by individuals who considered her to be
lesbian rather than bisexual. Individual G may have suffered virtually no
discrimination because few people recognize that he considers himself to be
bisexual. Individual H may have been treated as an outcast by both members of
the heterosexual and homosexual communities because she does not seem to
"fit in." 131 Before deciding that these bisexual individuals are deserving of
affirmative action, I would therefore want to hear their histories. When
affirmative action is being justified under the first rationale (disadvantage), I
would want to hear how individuals' sexual orientations have disadvantaged
them in their lives such that affirmative action makes sense.132
Because few institutions have adopted affirmative action plans on the basis
of sexual orientation, we have an opportunity to develop those rules with a
fresh start. Rather than mimic the rules that we have used in the race and
gender areas, it makes sense to ask broad questions about the nature of these
rules. Just as the Malones came "out" as black when affirmative action was
adopted in Boston, gay, lesbian, and bisexual people can be expected to come
"out" if affirmative action is adopted on the basis of sexual orientation. We
need to have a mechanism to determine which of the Malones in our society are
131 A particular bisexual individual may be any one of those three characters during
his or her lifetime. In fact, I have taken these stories from my own life experiences as a
bisexual individual. We therefore need to recognize the fluidity of our sexual orientation in
creating rules about the meaning of our sexual orientation in our lives.
132 Even the role model thesis can break down in the context of bisexuals. For
example, I consider myself to be a bisexual, but I am also married to a man. Although I am
an "out" bisexual in that I openly acknowledge my sexual feelings and history, my sexual
orientation is also largely hidden through my wearing of a traditional wedding ring. It is
hard for me to see how I can plausibly be seen as a positive bisexual role model. By
contrast, when I was involved with a woman (but still considered myself to be a bisexual), I
am sure that I was perceived as a lesbian. In fact, I remember when I broke up with a
woman and got involved with a man, I was told that it was too bad that I was dating a man
because I had been such a good lesbian role model! It never occurred to the speaker that I
had just become an excellent bisexual role model by openly changing the gender of my
partner. I therefore believe that it can be difficult to serve as a bisexual role model, although
I have found it to be true that students who identify as bisexual (or who are considering such
identification) often seek me out for conversation. I may therefore serve as a role model for
some students seeking to come to terms with their bisexual identity to some modest extent.
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deserving of affirmative treatment, as well as a rationale for our affirmative
action policy.
Byrne recognizes the definitional problems that might occur if we had
affirmative action in this area, but discounts them because he argues that self-
identification would be an accurate and fair way to deal with these definitional
problems. 133 Moreover, he says that self-identification is not likely to present
fraud problems for dishonest workers who want to benefit from affirmative
action based on sexual orientation, because the stigma associated with gay or
lesbian status is a sufficient deterrent.134 1 disagree with his argument because a
worker who can say, "I'm bisexual although I am happily married to someone
of the opposite sex," may not feel any stigma at all, especially if the workplace
is truly free of homophobia.
But even if Byrne is correct that there is little risk of fraudulent self-
identification, that response does not tell us who we believe is deserving of
affirmative treatment. If our rationale for affirmative action is assisting
individuals to overcome historical disadvantage, then we need to probe into
individual experiences of disadvantage. But possibly, overcoming a history of
disadvantage should not be our primary rationale in constructing affirmative
action in the gay and lesbian context. The primary rationale might be creating
positive gay, lesbian, and bisexual role models. In that case, we would want to
make sure that individuals obtaining preferential treatment will be "out of the
closet" and willing to work closely with the gay, lesbian, and bisexual
community as a positive role model. Finally, if our primary rationale for
affirmative action is to increase the diversity of ideas, then we need to probe
whether an individual's sexual orientation is reflected in his or her work or
scholarship. In sum, we need to be careful that we do not allow affirmative
action to reflect stereotypes of the gay, lesbian, and bisexual community. By
articulating our rationales for affirmative action carefully, we can devise
affirmative action policies that are carefully tailored to meet those rationales.
Not every gay, lesbian, or bisexual individual may qualify for affirmative
treatment under such carefully tailored rationales.
Because affirmative action for gay, lesbian, and bisexual people is likely to
be firmly resisted, it is especially important that we develop strategies that we
believe will be effective. Deming and Byrne, in writing the first articles on this
subject, already recognize the wide variation in the treatment of gay, lesbian,
and bisexual people. Let us build on that recognition, rather than repeat the
shortcomings of our racial experience. When we devise affirmative action
programs to meet the first rationale (overcoming disadvantage), let us use
affirmative action programs as an opportunity to share experiences of
133 Byrne, supra note 13, at 94-96.
134 Id
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disadvantage to target appropriate beneficiaries, as well as to educate ourselves
about the scope of mistreatment suffered by gay, lesbian, and bisexual people.
IV. GENDER
The bigender story is in many ways the most disturbing because we have
typically had subordinating treatment of individuals who cross gender
boundaries and have rarely begun to consider ameliorative treatment. Our
treatment of gender-crossing is punitive in that we force hermaphrodites to
have surgery at birth to "correct" their transgendered status, 135 while we treat
transsexuals with contempt for choosing to have surgery as adults to conform
their sexual genitalia to their perceived understanding of their gender.136
Similarly, we treat transvestites and preoperative transsexuals punitively by
refusing to tolerate their cross-dressing. 137 In each case, we insist that these
individuals fit a bipolar model of gender and consider them to be clinically
abnormal for failing to fall within the rigid bipolar model.
In order to understand the structure of the bipolar model, one must
understand how the various bi categories are used. That story is complicated
because the categories of transsexual, transvestite, androgyny, and
hermaphrodite are themselves reflective of the obsessive need to categorize
based on gender and sex. It is typical for commentators to try to distinguish
neatly between transvestites and transsexuals by saying that both individuals
may cross-dress, but that the transvestite does not desire to become
anatomically the opposite sex. 138 In fact, the distinction between the
transvestite and the transsexual is not clearly defined. For example, after a
period of cross-dressing, a transvestite may decide that he or she is actually a
transsexual and seek surgery. But then, the question arises whether the
individual who identified as a transvestite was really a transsexual all along. 139
Annie Woodhouse defines the distinction between the transvestite and the
transsexual as follows (using the male-to-female cross-dresser as her example):
Perhaps a more easily recognizable point of departure would be to consider the
transvestite as a person who identifies himself as a man-who-dresses-as-a-
woman. In contrast, the transsexual will identify himself as a woman who has
135 See Anne Fausto-Sterling, How Many &es Are There?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12,
1993, at A29.136 See infra part IV.A.
137 See infra part IV.A.
138 See, e.g., Phillips v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 731 F. Supp. 792, 795 n.5
(W.D. Mich. 1990), af§'d, 932 F.2d 969 (6th Cir. 1991).
139 See ANNM WOODHOUSE, FANrASTIC WOMEN: SEX, GENDER, AND TRANSVESTISM
19 (1989).
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the misfortune of a male body; the solution being, in his terms, hormone
therapy and sex reassignment surgery. In referring to the importance of
changing genital sex, April Ashley, a postoperative transsexual, comments that
as a biological male, "my genitals were quite alien to me." Typically, the
transvestite will display the opposite attitude, enjoying the best of both
worlds. 140
Another way that transvestites and transsexuals are often distinguished is
that a transvestite usually cross-dresses occasionally, whereas a transsexual is a
full-time cross-dresser. But this distinction becomes blurred in the case of the
full-time cross-dresser who has not undergone sex reassignment surgery (and
might not desire such surgery).141 In such cases, Woodhouse explains the
distinction as follows: "In many respects the differences between the
transvestite and the so-called transsexual lie with their own perceptions and
definitions of self: whether they consider themselves 'real women' or whether
they see cross-dressing as an end in itself which allows partial entry into the
world of femininity." 142
Commentators also typically try to distinguish the transsexual and
transvestite from the homosexual. Transsexuals usually do not want to be
considered homosexuals; transvestites do not want to be considered
transsexuals; and homosexuals often do not want to be considered transsexuals
or transvestites. 143 Many male-to-female cross-dressers (be they transsexuals
or transvestites) are sexually attracted to men. If the individual is a transvestite,
then he is usually classified as a homosexual (or more commonly a "drag
queen"). By contrast, if the individual is a preoperative transsexual, then the
individual may identify as a heterosexual who is attracted to men, but is
trapped in a man's body. The most interesting example that I have found of
the struggle to differentiate within categories occurs in Phillips v. Michigan
140 ld. at 19-20.
141 Id. at 46-47.
142 Id. at 47.
143 See Phillips v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 731 F. Supp. 792, 795 n.5 (W.D.
Mich. 1990) (distinguishing between a transsexual, homosexual, and transvestite), afftd, 932
F.2d 969 (6th Cir. 1991). Gay and lesbian groups seem recently to have become concerned
with transgender issues. The 1993 march on Washington for lesbian and gay civil rights, for
example, included transgender concerns in its list of concerns. See Dan Levy & David
Tuller, Transgender People Coming Out: Opening Up the World of Drag, S.F. CHRON.,
May 28, 1993, at Al, A17. Nonetheless, transgendered individuals report that they have
faced many obstacles from mainstream homosexuals who say that the presence of cross-
dressers at gay marches and parades offends straight people and undermines overall support
for the gay rights movement. Id.
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Department of Corrections. 44 Plaintiff was an inmate who claimed to be a
preoperative transsexual, but who was being denied estrogen and other
treatment by prison authorities. Before incarceration, plaintiff had adopted a
female name (despite retaining male genitalia) and was in a relationship with a
man, which plaintiff characterized as heterosexual. While in prison, plaintiff
was not receiving estrogen therapy, causing many of the female characteristics
previously attained through treatment to reverse themselves. 145 Nonetheless,
plaintiff considered herself to be a heterosexual, preoperative transsexual-not
a homosexual, not a male, and not a transvestite. One could, however, have
described plaintiff as a homosexual, male transvestite who was also a
preoperative male-to-female transsexual. The categorization system therefore
seems as important to the affected class (as a means of self-identity) as to the
society at large (as a means of oppression).
Interestingly, we therefore see a three-part, differentiated scheme within the
middle of the larger, bipolar gender classification scheme. At each highly
differentiated point within the middle, we have individuals who are challenging
sex or gender categories. Transvestites retain a traditional conception of their
biological sex while challenging gendered clothing rules for appearance.
Homosexuals retain a traditional conception of their biological sex while
challenging gendered rules for an appropriate sexual partner. And transsexuals
challenge a traditional conception of their biological sex while trying to
conform to the gender rules for the sex with which they identify.
The spectrum, however, becomes much more complicated if we include
hermaphrodites. Hermaphrodites are hard to place on the spectrum because
they are typically invisible rather than on the spectrum. By engaging the
hermaphrodite in surgery at birth, we assign that person to one pole of the
bipolar spectrum, rather than allowing the person to live as a transgendered
person. In the race area, commentators are worried about cultural genocide of
blacks through interracial adoption. 146 Here, we have a different kind of
cultural genocide. Instead of allowing a third, fourth, and even fifth sex to
develop (given the three types of hermaphrodites), 147 we engage in surgery
before the age of consent to eliminate each of these alternative genders and to
fix an individual purely in the male or female category. Thus, hermaphrodites
become an invisible aspect of the male and female poles.
144 731 F. Supp. 792.
145 Id at 794.
146 See supra part ILB.2.
147 Hermaphrodites constitute three subgroups: (1) they possess one testis and one
ovary, (2) they possess testes and some aspects of female genitalia, but not ovaries, or (3)
they have ovaries and some aspects of male genitalia, but lack testes. Fausto-Sterling, supra
note 135, at A29.
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Similarly, one might argue that a postoperative transsexual who has had
successful surgery could fit at one of the poles rather than at the middle.
Whether the postoperative transsexual fits into a pole depends on whether he or
she "passes." The postoperative transsexual who does not pass is left in the
indeterminate middle category (for example, with respect to sex-segregated
bathrooms) 148 with neither men nor women wanting to claim him or her as
their own.
The final group to add to the gender spectrum is individuals who are
considered to be androgynous. The term "androgyny" does not inherently
present a new category, but instead, presents a less negative way to describe
some of the other categories. The word "androgyny," derives from the Greek
"andro" (male),\and "gyne" (female). It historically described individuals who
were in possession of both sets of sexual organs-a hermaphrodite. 149 Today,
however, androgyny is usually understood to be a blending of gender, not
sexual organs, and is even considered to be "politically desirable." 150 Thus, we
use words with negative connotations-transsexual, transvestite, and
hermaphrodite-to describe individuals who cross gender lines, while we also
recognize (at least in some quarters) a new gender ideal-androgyny. The
existence of the "androgyny" category may reflect our attempt to move beyond
the sharp gendered divisions (at least when biological modifications have not
occurred), while we also retain punitive treatment for the other three
transgendered categories. Thus, one could imagine an individual saying, "No, I
am androgynous and not a transsexual, transvestite, or hermaphrodite," to
avoid punitive treatment. In reality, however, I have not seen an example of
anyone avoiding punitive treatment for his or her transgendered status in that
way.
A final and interesting gendered aspect to these categories is our
assumption as to whether men or women are predominantly in these categories.
The popular literature suggests that transsexualism is a phenomenon exclusive
to biological men who wish to become women. 151 In fact, there have always
been both male and female transsexuals. 152 The invisibility of female-to-male
transsexualism is itself an example of gender hierarchy. According to Dr.
148 See infra part V.A.
149 Gaudoin, supra note 9, at 116.
15 0 Id.
151 See, e.g., JANIcE G. RAYMOND, THE TRANsEXUAL EMPIRE: THE MAKING OF THE
SHE-MALE (1979).
152 See LESLIE MARTIN LOTHSTE]N, FEMALE-TO-MALE TRANSSEXUALISM:
HISTORICAL, CLINICAL, AND THEORETICAL ISSUES 308-11 (1983) (arguing that the male-
female sex ratios are approaching one-to-one); see a/so Amy Bloom, The Body Lies, NEW
YORKER, July 18, 1994, at 38 (interviewing female-to-male transsexuals).
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Leslie Lothstein, a leading clinician in the field,
The most critical reason why female transsexualism has been ignored clinically
probably relates to the current social and political status of female sexuality, in
which puritanical beliefs regarding female sexuality still have a pervasive
influence on clinical practice. In addition, most sexual researchers are male,
and their male-centered views (sometimes labeled as homocentric or
patricentric) have probably been communicated to women who have been
discouraged from applying to the gender clinics. 153
The topic of transsexualism is therefore quite a challenging one in helping us to
understand better our bipolar views on gender. Not only is the transsexual
generally despised or feared because of his or her challenge to conventional
gender and sex boundaries, but that challenge is often considered to be
implausible when the individual is a woman.
Exploring the bi within gender therefore shows an enormous range of
possibilities-all but one of which are despised by society for somewhat
differing reasons. Moreover, each of the subgroups do not necessarily align
with each other. They each do not want to share the "deviance" of the "other."
The despised nature of each of these subgroups reveals a great deal about our
intense need for a rigid bipolar system. Because that bipolar system must be
retained on both gender and sex lines, it is possibly harder to keep in place than
in the other areas that we have investigated. Investigating the middle therefore
helps us better see the rigidity of the poles. If we investigated solely the
definition of maleness and femaleness, the rigidity of the poles might not be as
obvious.
A. Pwitive Treatment
Both preoperative transsexuals and transvestites cross-dress, which is not
an accepted practice in our society. A preoperative transsexual dresses in
"opposite" sex clothing while receiving hormonal treatment to see if he or she
will truly be happier experiencing life as another gender. If the cross-dressing
phase is successful, surgery is often performed. 154
Individuals are routinely subjected to punitive treatment for cross-dressing,
153 LarHs'rmn, supra note 152, at 7.
154 Although people often talk about surgery as "correcting" gender dysphoria, it can
also be thought as "confirming" the gender that the individual already experiences. For
example, when Amy Bloom asked to see childhood (before surgery) pictures of an
individual who had had surgery to confirm his male gender, she was surprised to see
pictures of what appeared to be a little boy, not a little girl. See Bloom, supra note 152, at
40.
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and the law provides few protections. Title VII and state antidiscrimination
laws refuse to recognize discrimination against transsexuals, although clearly
their sex has become a condition of employment.' 55 The military subjects
individuals who cross-dress to court martial 156 and discharges transsexuals. 157
Similarly, Title VII fails to protect men or women against clothing regulations
that attempt to conform them to socially accepted rules for males and
females.' 58 As Mary Whisner has powerfully argued, the rules against cross-
dressing reinforce gender differentiation. 159 Individuals who do not care to
reinforce gender differentiation through their clothing and appearance are
unprotected legally and clinically labeled as having "gender dysphoria." 160
And although gender dysphoria is recognized as a psychiatric disorder by the
medical profession,161 the Americans with Disabilities Act explicitly excludes
transsexuals and transvestites from protection.' 62
The bane of a transsexual's existence is public restrooms. Single-sex
restrooms are, of course, standard features in most buildings other than private
homes, although we got rid of bathrooms segregated by race years ago. The
ostensible rationale is safety (under the false premise that the only rape which
occurs is committed by men against women) and privacy (which, itself, is
defined along heterosexual and gendered lines), but even those rationales
155 See, e.g., Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
471 U.S. 1017 (1985); Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982);
Kirkpatrick v. Seligman & Latz, Inc., 636 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1981); Halloway v. Arthur
Andersen and Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977); Powell v. Read's, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 369
(D. Md. 1977); Voyles v. Ralph D. Davies Medical Ctr., 403 F. Supp. 456 (N.D. Cal.
1975), af'd, 570 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1978); Snyder v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 842
P.2d 624 (Colo. Sup. Ct. 1993); In re Grossman, 384 A.2d 855 (N.J. Super. 1978); Doe v.
Boeing Co., 846 P.2d 531 (Wash. 1993).
156 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 26 M.I. 445 (C.M.A. 1988).
157 Leyland v. Orr, 828 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1987); Doe v. Alexander, 510 F. Supp.
900 (D. Minn. 1981).
158 See generally Mary Whisner, Gender-Specific Clothing Regulation: A Study in
Patiardy, 5 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 73, 97-106 (1982).
159 Id. at 97-101; see also Karl E. Klare, Power/Dressing: Regulation of Employee
Appearance, 26 NEWENG. L. REv. 1395, 1414-21 (1992).
160 Transsexualism also exists on a spectrum. "High-intensity" transsexualism is the
type that is "cured" with surgery. See Bloom, supra note 152, at 47.
161 Nonetheless, the American Psychiatric Association at its 1993 annual conference
proposed that well-adjusted transsexuals not antomatically be considered to have a mental
disorder. Levy & Tuller, supra note 143, at A17.
162 Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12,211(b)(1) (Supp. V 1993)
(excluding "transvestism, transsexualism, pedophilia, exhibitionism, voyeurism, gender
identity disorders not resulting from physical impairments, or other sexual behavior
disorders" from the term "disability").
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dissipate in many contexts because of the existence of doors on bathroom stalls.
The unavailability of any acceptable public restroom can cause substantial
hardship in the life of a transsexual. Pat Williams tells a story about "S." who
was a postoperative transsexual at a California law school, but who could not
get either the male or female students to allow her to use their bathroom. 16 3
The dean of the law school also refused to allow the student to use his private
bathroom out of fear that he would have been considered to have engaged in
preferential treatment. As Williams says, "Into the middle of that struggle, S.
was coming to me because others had defined her as 'nobody.'' 164 Bathroom
problems have frequently arisen in the reported cases involving discrimination
against transsexuals. 165 If public bathrooms were not sex-segregated, these
classification problems for transsexuals would not occur.
Sex-segregated bathrooms do not only pose problems for transsexuals; they
create gender differentiation for all men and women. At my own institution, for
example, we have similar male and female bathrooms for faculty and staff (with
several private toilet areas), except that the male bathroom also has a shower
area. When I joined the faculty and expressed a desire to have access to that
shower area, the university was kind enough to make a "woman in shower"
sign for me that I could put over the door to the men's bathroom to convert it
temporarily into a "woman's space." That solution satisfied my needs without
breaking down the rigid gender barriers. No one, of course, suggested
(including me) that we simply designate each bathroom as sex-neutral with
individuals who want privacy in the shower having the option of putting up a
"person in shower" sign when they wanted to temporarily close off one of the
two bathrooms to others. This experience has also amused me by causing me
some gender confusion as I struggle to remember whether I am a man or a
woman when I go to the bathroom for faculty and staff. I often pause before the
door, trying to remember what my purpose is at that moment-showering has
become a male activity for me and using the toilet has become a female
activity. If I need to change a sanitary napkin while using the shower, I often
feel uncomfortable that I have trespassed in inappropriate territory when I
discretely dispose of my garbage. Even as a feminist, I have been trained so
well in the gendered rules of our society that I have trouble breaking them to
dispose of a sanitary napkin in a bathroom labeled "men." Although sex-
segregated bathrooms are typically considered a benign form of
163 Patricia Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal
Opportunity, 87 MlCH. L. REV. 2128, 2144-46 (1989).
164 I. at 2146.
165 See, e.g., Sommers v. Budget Mktg., Inc., 667 F.2d 748 (8th Cir. 1982)
(imvolving complaints made by other female employees who did not want Sommers, a
postoperative male-to-female transsexual, to use the women's rest room).
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differentiation, 16 6 they may actually reflect a deep-seated, and in some cases
coercive, desire to maintain a rigid artificial distinction between the sexes.
Despite the fact that the legal challenges brought by transsexuals often
strike at the heart of our gender classification system, they are rarely taken
seriously. Richard Green does an excellent job describing the mistreatment of
transsexuals under the law in comparison to "transracials":
If there were a manner by which a person could "change race" rather than
"sex," could a "transracial" be denied protection under Title VII? Race, for
some persons, may be no more immutable than is sex for others. Consider a
person of mixed black and white racial heritage, tan skinned, with moderately
curled hair and no facial features clearly identifiable as black. Assume this
person has always "as far back as s(he) can remember" been self-identified as
black, but, nevertheless, has been treated by society as white. In the past, this
person has utilized grooming chemicals that straighten hair. Assume also that
the person is legally classified as white, having the requisite number of white
ancestors. Now the person stops utilizing hair straightening chemicals, and
undergoes plastic surgery to broaden the contours of the nose. Then, in
keeping with a racial identity as black, this person presents himself or herself
to the world as black. Should an employer consider this person as white or
black? If the person were to be not hired or fired on the basis of membership in
a racial class that has been the target of discrimination, would this be legally
permissible? If the person were to be not hired or fired on the basis of having
chmged race, would this be legally permissible?167
The punitive treatment of transsexuals and transvestites and the coerced
modification of the biology of hermaphrodites at birth is well-accepted. We are
so insistent on maintaining the myth of a bipolar sex and gender system that we
fail to tolerate any examples that undermine that classification system.
B. Ameliorative Treatment?
Affirmative action for transsexuals, transvestites, and hermaphrodites is
hard to imagine at this time in our history. The most positive steps that have
been taken include a failure to continue to coerce individuals to maintain a
gender identity that they have abandoned. Thus, for example, courts often
allow transsexuals to change their names from an obviously male name to an
166 See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 468-69 (1985)
(Marshall, I., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (suggesting that sex-
segregated bathrooms are not problematic with his statement, "A sign that says 'men only'
looks very different on a bathroom door than a courthouse door.").
167 Richard Green, Spelling "Relief'for Tranrsexua.: Employment Discain'adon and
the Criteia ofSex, 4 YALE L. & POL'YRv. 125, 138 (1985).
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obviously female name, 168 although courts also sometimes refuse to allow
transsexuals to have their birth certificates changed to match their sexual
identity. 169 One of the most positive legal recognitions of a transsexual
occurred in a divorce case in which the ex-husband tried to avoid support and
maintenance payments by arguing that his wife, a male-to-female transsexual,
was really a man, so that the marriage was void. 170 Ruling in favor of the
transsexual wife, the court said that the "transsexual is not committing a fraud
upon the public. In actuality she is doing her utmost to remove any false
facade." 171 Of course, however, the case was predicated on the bipolar
assumption, which the court described as "almost universal," that "a lawful
marriage requires the performance of a ceremonial marriage of two persons of
the opposite sex, a male and a female." 172 The court therefore had to place the
wife in a rigidly bipolar framework in order to conduct the appropriate legal
analysis; in no way does the court's decision undermine the polarized
conception of gender that underlies our marriage laws. Nonetheless, other
courts have been less liberal in tolerating the desired gender status of a
postoperative transsexual who sought to take advantage of the institution of
marriage. 173
168 See, e.g., In re Anonymous, 314 N.Y.S.2d 668 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1970); In re
Anonymous, 293 N.Y.S.2d 834 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1968).
169 See, e.g., Anonymous v. Mellon, 398 N.Y.S.2d 99 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (holding
judicial intervention inappropriate); Hartin v. Director of the Bureau of Records and
Statistics, 347 N.Y.S.2d 515 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973) (holding that Department of Health did
not act capriciously in issuing a new certificate changing only the first name of petitioner
and omitting any designation of sex); Anonymous v. Weiner, 270 N.Y.S.2d 319 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1966) (holding judicial intervention not appropriate to reverse Department of Health's
refusal to change birth certificate designation). But see K v. Health Div., 552 P.2d 840 (Or.
Ct. App. 1976) (holding court to have authority to order change of name and sex
designation on birth certificate), rev'd, 560 P.2d 1070 (Or. 1977) (holding issue should be
decided by legislature).
170 M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 207 (NJ. Super. Ct. 1976), cert. denied, 364 A.2d
1076 (NJ. 1976). For another case involving positive treatment of a transsexual, see
Christian v. Randall, 516 P.2d 132 (Colo. Ct. App. 1973) (denying custody petition by
father who objected to children staying with wife who was undergoing female-to-male
transsexual procedure). But see Daly v. Daly, 715 P.2d 56 (Nev.) (terminating parental
rights of postoperative female-to-male transsexual), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 876 (1986);
Frances B. v. Mark B., 355 N.Y.S.2d 712 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) (holding postoperative
female-to-male transsexual could not succeed on divorce claim as no valid marriage had
been entered into since he had no male sex organs).
171 M.T, 355 A.2d at 210.
172 Id. at 207.
173 See, e.g., In re Declaratory Relief for Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio Prob. 1987)
(denying marriage license to postoperative male-to-female transsexual to marry male).
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Although affirmative action for transsexuals, transvestites, and
hermaphrodites seems implausible at this time in our history, one might argue
that our tolerance for "corrective surgery" for transsexuals and hermaphrodites
is an expression of ameliorative treatment. Transsexualism, or gender
dysphoria, for example, is considered to be such a serious problem that surgery
is covered under Medicaid. 174 Some commentators argue that such treatment is
clearly ameliorative because, without surgery, many individuals would suffer
long-term discontent. 175
The public welfare cases may present a plausible example of ameliorative
treatment, but they also show how extreme the condition of transsexuals must
be in order to get any public assistance. In the prison context, for example,
transsexuals argue that it would be "cruel and unusual punishment" or
"deliberate indifference" for them to be denied estrogen therapy or surgery.' 76
174 See, e.g., Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1980) (finding Iowa's policy
of denying Medicaid benefits for sex reassignment surgery inconsistent with the objectives
of the Medicaid statute); J.D. v. Lackner, 145 Cal. Rptr. 570 (Ct. App. 1978) (finding that
Medi-Cal benefits cover radical sex conversion surgery for treatment of transsexualism);
G.B. v. Lackner, 145 Cal. Rptr. 555 (Ct. App. 1978) (finding Medi-Cal claimant entitled to
benefits for surgery to treat trnssexualism); Doe v. State Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 257
N.W.2d 816 (Minn. 1977) (finding decision to deny medical assistance benefits to adult
male transsexual arbitrary and unreasonable); Denise R. v. Lavine, 364 N.Y.S.2d 557
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) (finding denial of benefits for sex conversion operation arbitrary and
capricious), rev'd, 347 N.E.2d 893 (N.Y. 1976) (finding denial not to be arbitrary or
capricious). Prison inmates, however, have not been successful in obtaining estrogen
therapy as a treatment for transsexualism. See, e.g., Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 935 (1987); Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958 (10th Cir.
1986); Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977); Farmer v. Carlson, 685 F. Supp.
1335 (M.D. Pa. 1988); Lamb v. Maschner, 633 F. Supp. 351 (D. Kan. 1986).
175 See Green, supra note 167, at 125, 128. Nonetheless, the American Psychiatric
Association, at its 1993 annual conference proposed that well-adjusted transsexuals not
automatically be considered to have a mental disorder. Levy & Tuller, supra note 143, at
A17.
176 See, e.g., White v. Farrier, 849 F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1988) (denying summary
judgment because not appropriate on issue of whether transsexual inmate was subjected to
deliberate indifference through failure to be given estrogen therapy); Meriwether, 821 F.2d
408 (finding that trnssexual inmate stated claim under Eighth Amendment for failure to
provide estrogen therapy and emphasizing that inmate was not entitled to estrogen therapy,
but was entitled to medical treatment); Phillips v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 731 F.
Supp. 792 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (granting preliminary injunction ordering correctional
officials to provide transsexual inmate with estrogen therapy), affid, 932 F.2d 969 (6th Cir.
1991); Famer, 685 F. Supp. 1335 (finding that transsexual inmate had been denied proper
medical care by being denied conjugated estrogens); Lamb, 633 F. Supp. 351 (finding that
inmate had no constitutional right to preoperative hormone treatment and sex change
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Lawyers have to describe the prisoners' situation in horrific terms to meet this
exceedingly, inappropriately high standard. The American Psychiatric
Association has recently concluded that not all transsexuals need to be classified
as having a personality disorder.177 Yet, transsexuals have been taught that
they virtually have to commit suicide in order to receive public assistance.178
Judges must be convinced that the choice is between suicide or estrogen
therapy. Little else would meet the stringently high standard. Our legal
standards therefore reinforce a stark, bipolar model because the courts are only
presented with suicidal transsexuals.
Given the dramatic stories of suicidal behavior that are required to obtain
public assistance for transsexuals, it is hard to describe the granting of public
assistance as ameliorative treatment. Saving an individual from suicide does
little to place an individual on the road to a happy and successful life. We have
much further to go in our treatment of transsexuals before we could describe
our treatment of them as truly benign. A postoperative transsexual still faces
enormous hardships and barriers in a society that cannot accept his or her
transgendered status, as in Pat Williams's example of the postoperative
transsexual who was not permitted to use any of the bathrooms at law
school.179
As for hermaphrodites, it is very difficult to consider the surgery that is
routinely provided at birth as ameliorative.180 This coerced treatment has
caused Anne Fausto-Sterling to ask,
Why should we care if there are people whose biological equipment enables
them to have sex "naturally" with both men and women? The answers seem to
lie in a need to maintain clear distinctions between the sexes. Society mandates
the control of intersexual bodies because they blur and bridge the great divide;
they challenge traditional beliefs about sexual difference. Hermaphrodites have
operation).
177 See Green, supra note 167, at 135-36.
178 In order for plaintiffs to prevail in the prison context, they typically have to attempt
to commit suicide or to remove some of their own sexual organs. For example, in Supre v.
Rickets, plaintiff attempted to remove his testicles six times, attempted to kill himself by
hanging, and incised and removed a portion of his scrotum. 596 F. Supp. 1532, 1533 (D.
Colo. 1984), rev'd, 792 F.2d 958 (10th Cir. 1986). Before successful judicial intervention
occurred, the prison took the position that treatment for gender dysphoria could not occur in
a penal setting. Id. at 1534. In concluding that medical treatment was appropriate, the judge
ruled that "plaintiff's life was in jeopardy." Id. at 1535. It is appalling that an individual has
to attempt multilations, castrations, and suicide before a court can find that he or she is
entitled to medical treatment for gender dysphoria.
179 See upra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
180 See Fausto-Sterling, supra note 135.
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unruly bodies. They do not fail into a binary classification: only a surgical
shoehorn can put them there.18 1
Hermaphrodites are usually required to have surgery when they are infants,
long before the age of consent. The decision to have surgery is virtually
automatic, rather than reflective of whether there is any medical182 or even
psychological reason for surgery. If we, as a society, were not so horrified at
the existence of hermaphrodites, we would allow surgery decisions to be made
by an informed adult rather than by a (probably hysterical) parent. We would
be able to tolerate more individualized treatment.
Interestingly, hermaphrodites and transsexuals reflect two different kinds of
bigendered categories which we "cure" with surgery to the sex organs.
Hermaphrodites reflect a mixing of biological sexual traits that we are not able
to tolerate. Transsexuals reflect a mixing of gendered traits that we "cure" by
changing the biological sex to match the gendered sex. In both cases, we
"solve" the problem by engaging in surgery on the biological sex organs. In
neither case, do we try to' "solve" the problem by changing conventional
understandings of sex and gender. It makes one wonder who is sick-
hermaphrodites, transsexuals, or able-bodied society?
In the gender area, an investigation of the bi category reveals that there are
many individuals who live in the middle or even move along the spectrum
during their lives. Yet, we linguistically talk about "opposite" sexes and have
no or little tolerance for individuals who try to live in the middle categories.
We also have little tolerance for individuals who try to change from one polar
category to another. We have to be sure to starkly define male and female by
even insisting on the clothing we wear. 183 As a society, we are not sufficiently
comfortable with how nature inherently distinguishes male from female. And,
for those individuals who attempt to "play with nature" by changing their
gender, we display our strongest sense of outrage.
V. DIsABnmrY LAW: A NEw APPROACH
Unlike the other areas of the law examined in this Article, we have no term
for bi individuals in disability rights law. Thus, it is hard to focus a discussion
on how we have treated bi-abled individuals because we have never recognized
181 Id.
182 There are life-threatening conditions that can occur as a result of being a
hermaphrodite: hernias, gonadal tumors, and adrenal malfunction. Id.
183 Until 1993, New Orleans had a law that banned cross-dressing except during
Mardi Gras. See Dawn Ruth, Mity Ban on Gay Bar Employees Repealed, TIMES-PICAYUNE,
Mar. 20, 1993, atB3.
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that they exist as a distinct category. Nonetheless, disability rights law is
concerned with definition and who fits into the category of "disabled." If one
does not fit into that polarized category, no ameliorative benefits are available.
Similarly, there have been discussions recently about the "abuse" of the
disability rights law by individuals who are not "really" disabled, such as
individuals with attention deficit disorder. 184 Because of the skepticism of such
claims of disability, we may be creating bi categories for heightened (or
unrectified) mistreatment. The absence of a linguistic category, therefore, does
not entirely assure us that subordination is not occurring due to one's presence
in a bi category. Nonetheless, I cannot find any examples of mistreatment due
to bi-abled status that seem comparable to those that I discussed in the gender
or sexual orientation areas, 185 such as a court martial for an individual who
identifies as a transsexual.
Disabilities rights law also offers a perspective that is refreshingly different
from the one that has historically been used in the areas of sexual orientation,
race, or gender. The cornerstone to legal analysis under the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) 186 and the related Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act (IDEA)187 is that individuals with disabilities should receive
individualized assessments. There is a bipolar distinction between able-bodied
and disabled that suffers from the previously discussed problems of bipolar
distinctions, but within the category of disabled, there is individualized
treatment. In this part of the Article, I will explore the effectiveness of this
individualized treatment model to see what lessons we might learn if we wanted
to try to develop a more individually-based model in the areas of race, gender,
or sexual orientation.
A. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
The IDEA is based on a bipolar model-disabled children are entitled to
certain benefits and nondisabled children are not. Each disabled child188 is
184 See, e.g., Richard E. Vatz, Attention Defcit Deliriwn, WALL ST. I., July 27, 1994,
at A10; Gary Eisler, Attention Deficit Disorder Can't Be Ignored, WALL ST. I., June 27,
1994, at A12; DisabilitiessDisenter Crushed, WALL ST. I., May 18, 1994, at A14.185 See supra parts It.A, V.A.
186 42 U.S.C. §§ 12,101-12,213 (Supp. V 1993).
187 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1485 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (formerly known as the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act).
188 Under the IDEA,
The term "children with disabilities" means children-
(i) with mental retardation, hearing impairments including deafness, speech or
language impairments, visual impairments including blindness, serious emotional
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guaranteed an individualized educational plan. 189 Nonetheless, once an
individual is placed within the label "disabled," individualized treatment does
occur. There is no automatic assessment that a child should receive an
integrated, segregated, or at-home education.' 90 The setting for the child's
education, as well as its structure, is developed on an individualized basis.
In theory, this model is an improvement over the one that we have seen in
the race, sexual orientation, and gender areas, because it causes educational
institutions to meet with parents, children, and professionals to develop an
appropriate educational plan for each child with disabilities. There is no
assumption that all children who are "retarded," for example, must be in a
special classroom. Instead, each retarded child is evaluated to see exactly what
kind of education is appropriate. One retarded child might be placed in a
special classroom for children with substantial learning disabilities, another
retarded child might be placed in a normal classroom with a special aide, and
another retarded child might spend half a day in a special classroom and half a
disturbance, orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health
impairments, or specific learning disabilities; and
(ii) who, by reason thereof, need special education and related services.
20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
189 Under the IDEA,
The term "individualized education program" means a written statement for each child
with a disability developed in any meeting by a representative of the local educational
agency or an intermediate educational unit who shall be qualified to provide, or
supervise the provision of, specially designed instruction to meet the unique needs of
children with disabilities, the teacher, the parents or guardian of such child, and,
whenever appropriate, such child, which statement shall include [six criteria].
Md § 1401(a)(20).
19 0 Nonetheless, there is a policy decision contained within the statute that education in
an integrated setting (both able-bodied and disabled children being educated together) is
preferable, if possible:
[A] State shall demonstrate.., procedures to assure that, to the maximum extent
appropriate, children with disabilities, including children in public or private institutions
or other care facilities, are educated with children who are not disabled, and that special
classes, separate schooling, or other removal of children with disabilities from the
regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the
disability is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids
and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.
20 U.S.C. § 1412(5) (1988).
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day in a normal classroom. Moreover, the plan for each of these children will
vary from year to year depending upon how they progress and what programs
are available in their state or school district. This individualized treatment is
quite a dramatic improvement from the days when such children monolithically
received either no education or a segregated and quite inadequate education.
The procedure underlying the IDEA, however, is far from perfect. Poor
children who have less access to legal advocacy get less individualized
treatment. Because, by definition, the individuals who are entitled to assistance
under the statute are children who also have disabilities that require special
services, advocacy typically happens by the parents of a child. Parents with
middle-class professional training find it easier to advocate within such a
structure. 191 Moreover, the process of using an administrative structure is very
time-consuming. Working-class people or unemployed individuals with family
responsibilities find it difficult to take off from work or family obligations to
attend numerous administrative hearings and meetings. 192 In cases in which
parents have challenged the adequacy of the public school's placement of a
child, often the parents pay for their child's private education while the
inadequacy of the public education is being resolved legally. 193 That option is
not available to poor parents.
The IDEA model raises the question of whether an individualized treatment
model is inherently class-based. This question is particularly troublesome in the
context of the IDEA, because the statute attempts to be sensitive to racial and
ethnic biases that may be part of disability law through special rules.' 9 4 Such
rules may help states avoid using racial stereotypes in defining who has
disabilities. Unfortunately, it does little for the child who has been correctly
characterized as having a disability. Once the classification occurs, the statute
requires no special sensitivity to that child's needs due to the race, ethnic, or
191 David Engel studied parent participation in individualized educational plans (IEP)
and found that "effective parental participation in the IEP conference, however, proved to
be the exception rather than the rule." David M. Engel, Law, Culture, and Odildren with
Disabilities: Educational Rights and the Construction of Difference, 1991 DUKE L.. 166,
179 (1991).
192 Engel found that most parents stopped attending their individual hearing after the
first few years. Id. at 188.
193 See, e.g., W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d
1479 (9th Cir. 1992); Tribble v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 798 F. Supp. 668
(M.D. Ala. 1992); Dreher v. Amphitheater Unified Sch. Dist., 797 F. Supp. 753 (D. Ariz.
1992), affid, 22 F.3d 228 (9th Cir. 1994).
194 For example, the section on eligibility requirements states that each state must have
procedures "to assure that testing and evaluation materials and procedures utilized for the
purposes of evaluation and placement of children with disabilities will be selected and
administered so as not to be racially or culturally discriminatory." 20 U.S.C. § 1412(5).
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class bias of our educational or legal system.
The further question that this problem raises is whether there would be less
class bias in a system with more formal, categorical rules and less
individualized treatment. In other contexts, some scholars have suggested that
formality benefits disadvantaged individuals because less discretion exists on
the part of decisionmakers. 195 Although I agree with the critique of
discretionary, informal systems, that critique does not offer us an obvious
solution. By limiting ourselves to a formal system because of our fear of the
race or class biases of discretionary systems of justice, we take a very
pessimistic perspective that we cannot possibly rid our justice system of its
discretionary biases. If we truly believe that children with disabilities will fare
best through individualized determinations, our obligation as a society is to try
to make available the resources that will allow those determinations to be made
in a fair fashion. The IDEA does try to minimize the arbitrariness of such
discretion by providing extensive procedural safeguards and administrative
steps. Those safeguards are consistent with the argument that "[flormality and
adversarial procedures thus counteract bias among legal decisionmakers and
disputants." 196 As noted above, however, such additional procedures are costly
in time and legal fees and therefore are not equally available to all children with
disabilities. Free legal services for all children with disabilities who come from
poor families could make those procedures more widely available.
Unfortunately, the IDEA does not provide for such services, although many
cities have public interest organizations that try to fill that need. 197 Finally, it is
difficult even to formulate an effective way to use legal advocacy because, as
many parents recognize, it is important to have a good long-term relationship
with a school district if one has a child with disabilities. Contentious litigation
could undermine a child's long-term interests, even if the litigation is
successful.198 Thus, it takes a very sophisticated parent and lawyer to advocate
effectively on behalf of a child.
Critics of my proposal would point to the costs involved in increasing legal
services to poor children with disabilities. The answer to these critics,
195 See Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Fonnality: Minimizing the Risk of
Prejudce in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359, 1389 (1985) (arguing
that racial prejudice is more likely to occur in informal, discretionary settings than in
formal, adjudicatory settings because the "human propensity to prejudge and make
irrational categorizations is... checked by procedural safeguards found in an adversarial
system").
196 Id. at 1389 (footnote omitted).
197 In Pittsburgh, for example, we have the Education Law Center, which tries to
provide those services for free to children with disabilities. Nonetheless, it takes a
sophisticated parent or guardian to find such services and use them aggressively.
198 See Engel, supra note 190, at 194-203.
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however, is not a difficult one. Under our Constitution and legal system, we
recognize few rights to be as important as a free public education. 199 A child
with disabilities who does not receive a free, appropriate education loses out on
a lifetime of possibilities. As the Supreme Court has said, "[Education] is a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him
for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his
environment." 200 Some costs of an inadequate education are monetary costs to
society in lost productivity, but more importantly, those costs include the
psychic and emotional costs of not developing the skills and abilities to live a
fulfilling life. Thus, it seems like a very modest suggestion to say that we
should try to do our very best to rid the IDEA framework of class or race bias.
The problem with suggesting that we allocate whatever costs are necessary
to rid the IDEA of class or race bias is that class or race bias in education is
not limited to children who are disabled. Why does a child who qualifies as
retarded under the IDEA get full-scale individualized treatment to help
maximize his or her educational possibilities, whereas another child who might
have a below normal I.Q., but is not technically retarded, gets no
individualized treatment at all? Similarly, why does a child who has an
exceptional I.Q. not get individualized treatment to help maximize his or her
potential? All children, one might argue, have individualized potentials. Why
do we primarily care about the potential of the child who fits into the category
"disabled"? Also, why should a child have to suffer the stigma of being
classified as disabled to receive individualized attention?20 1
199 See, e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). In Brown v. Board
of Education, the Court explained,
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments.... In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an
opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be
available to all on equal terms.
Id.
200 Id.
20 1 This stigma is quite complicated in the disability context. We tend to think of
individuals with disabilities in the educational context as retarded or stupid. Children with
physical disabilities that do not affect their mental capacity therefore often find it difficult to
find an appropriate educational setting, because the special programs are usually for
retarded children. In such a case, our shortsightedness in defining "disability" leaves a child
with physical disabilities few acceptable educational choices. See generally Engel, supra
note 190, at 185 (describing difficulties in finding placement for an intelligent handicapped
child because school districts often assume that "the physically handicapped person is
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These are difficult and important questions. The IDEA recognizes the
stigma associated with the classification of "disabled," which is why there is
special attention to how classifications can be made inappropriately due to race
or ethnic bias. Similarly, the IDEA supports an integrated education, when
feasible, in part to lessen the stigma associated with separate education. On the
other hand, the IDEA forces a parent or guardian to seek to have his or her
child categorized as disabled to receive special services.
Since the IDEA already uses individualized determinations to create
appropriate educational programs, I would argue that a child should not have to
be classified as disabled to argue for special services. One could, for example,
say that all children who have special disability-related needs should be able to
seek individualized services. A child may not be disabled with respect to his
intellect, but may be disabled with respect to his vision. His vision might not
be so poor as to render the child visually impaired or blind. Nonetheless, the
child might benefit from some individualized attention to his vision ranging
from a seat near the front of the classroom to special equipment for certain
science exercises. Aside from cost, there is no reason not to make available to
all students whatever assistance they need in overcoming particularized
disabilities they may have, even if they do not fit the definition of "children
with disabilities."
The larger problem that this discussion raises is whether benefits should be
tied directly to whether one is disabled-whether we are inappropriately using
the term "disabled" in a stereotypical way. I believe that we are. The issue
should not be whether a person is disabled as that term is defined under the
IDEA. Instead, the issue should be whether a person is not able to receive an
appropriate education because of a disability. In other words, does the so-called
disability actually disadvantage an individual? If the disability does not
disadvantage an individual, then an individualized analysis of special needs is
not necessary; if a disability does disadvantage an individual, then an
individualized analysis is necessary, even if the person does not technically fit
the definition of "children with disabilities." We contribute to the stigma
associated with disability by assuming that all children with disabilities have
special educational needs, and that no child who is technically able-bodied has
special educational needs related to a disability.
A more concrete example may illuminate this discussion. 202 Three children
may be in a classroom. Child A may be blind, child B may have strabismus
(commonly known as crossed eyes), which leaves her with vision that is
correctable to normal although she does not have stereoscopic vision (the
automatically retarded").
202 This example comes from my own experience in a ninth grade biology class, as
well as my experience teaching in a classroom with some blind students.
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ability to use both eyes at the same time, thereby gaining depth perception),
and child C may not have the use of his legs. Let us assume further that they
are in the same science class. Child A will not be able to read the class material
or use a microscope without some kind of technological assistance. Child B
will be able to read the course materials, but will not be able to use a
stereoscopic microscope to see objects in depth. Child C will be able to read all
of the class material, and use the microscope. Under the IDEA, children A and
C are disabled and entitled to individualized education plans; child B is not
disabled.
During a particular class session, however, in which the lesson is
structured around the use of a stereoscopic microscope at a desk, child C may
not be experiencing any educational disadvantage related to his disability,203
whereas children A and B may be experiencing educational disadvantage. The
IDEA would expect the school to assist child A, but not child B, although they
may be experiencing similar problems-they cannot use the microscope to see
depth as part of the class assignment.204 Rather than focus on whether they fit a
global definition of "disability," I would suggest that it makes more sense to
ask whether the disabilities that they have are depriving them of educational
experiences. In the case of children A and B, the answer would be yes; in the
case of child C, the answer would be no (on this particular day).
This solution, like the legal aid solution, of course, might cost money. We
may not be able to afford to solve all of A's, B's, and C's problems of
disadvantage related to disability. That, however, is not a new problem. The
Supreme Court has ruled that the IDEA does not provide each child with the
right to a "potential-maximizing education." 205 Instead, it provides each child
with the right to "specialized instruction and related services which are
individually designed to provide educational benefit to the handicapped
child." 2°6 The Supreme Court made this decision out of the recognition that
"the educational opportunities provided by our public school system
undoubtedly differ from student to student, depending upon a myriad of factors
that might affect a particular student's ability to assimilate information
presented in the classroom." 20 7 The solution, however, is not to use categories
instead of individualized assessments. The solution for children A and B for
203 1 am assuming that child C has been given a desk that is appropriate for a
wheelchair.
204 qy* Jasany v. United States Postal Serv., 755 F.2d 1244 (6th Cir. 1985) (finding
individual with strabismus not disabled for the purposes of the nondiscrimination clause of
the Rehabilitation Act).
205 Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 197 n.21 (1982).
206 Id. at 201.
207 Id. at 198.
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that particular assignment in that science room may be costless-maybe they
need to be paired with another student (like student C) who can use the
stereoscopic microscope and could verbally describe what he or she is able to
see. By contrast, if the only good solution for child B is a special, very
expensive microscope, we may decide that the cost is not worth the modest
gain in educational experience. Child B can attain educational benefit in that
classroom without a special microscope for one assignment. By contrast, child
A may need technological equipment so that she can read her course
assignments. Because she can attain no educational benefit without such
equipment, it should be provided to her. Finally, child C may come to school
with a wheelchair and face no barriers in the classroom. Although he is
disabled, he may have few or no special needs or costs and does not need a
specialized educational plan for his substantive classes so long as the building is
barrier-free. On the other hand, when we move out of the science classroom to
the physical education classroom, the needs of children A, B, and C change
enormously. Child C will then probably become a child with a disability-
related disadvantage.
The lesson from these examples is that individualized assessments of
disability-related disadvantage should determine our decisions about how to
allocate resources to assist children, not whether children fit into certain bipolar
categories. As people move from context to context, they take their range of
disabilities and abilities with them; we can help remove the stigma associated
with disability if we recognize the disability within each of us, and we can
more effectively deal with disabilities if we assess them from the perspective of
the disadvantages that they pose for us in our lives.208
B. Americans with Disabilities Act
Like the IDEA, the ADA also uses a bipolar disabled and able-bodied
distinction. 2°9 An individual who is not technically disabled receives no
20 8 Federal nondiscrimination law does just the opposite. An individual, for example,
is not disabled under § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act or under the ADA unless the
impairment substantially limits one of the individual's major life activities, such as
employment potential. See Rehabilitation Act of 1973 § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988 &
Supp. V 1993); 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2). Thus, an individual with strabismus who is
discharged because he cannot perform one discrete function at a job is not sufficiently
impaired to come under the statutory definition of disability. See Jasany, 755 F.2d 1244. I
am arguing, by contrast, that we examine the concrete situation to see if a disability poses a
disadvantage rather than worry about whether the individual experiences disability in other
facets of his or her life. To the unemployed postal worker in Jasany, it is no solace to
realize that his disability does not impair his ability to perform other employment.
209 Under the ADA, the term "disability" means, "(A) a physical or mental
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protection from discrimination and is not entitled to reasonable accommodation.
On the other hand, if an individual is disabled, a broad arena of protection
opens up.
The problem with this bipolar distinction can be seen in cases involving
individuals who are "obese." Some courts have ruled that individuals who are
obese are not covered by antidiscrimination law, other courts have ruled that
individuals are covered only if the obesity is caused by systemic or metabolic
factors, and yet other courts have ruled that obese individuals are always
covered by antidiscrimination law so long as the employer perceives their
obesity to impair their ability to do the job.210 The fact that the courts have
reached such a wide variety of answers on this question suggests that it is a
close legal question. On the one hand, obese individuals do face negative
stereotypes, and their status is typically caused by a physical condition. On the
other hand, there is no easy way to define "obesity," and the condition is not
necessarily always a medical one. But more importantly, why should whether
an individual obtains a $100,000 legal judgment2 l depend on the result of such
a close legal question when, undoubtedly, individuals who are obese face
discrimination based on unfounded stereotypes?
The most recent example that highlights the inappropriateness of the
bipolar framework under the ADA involves Deborah Birdwell. Birdwell had
wanted to see a movie with her niece.212 Knowing that she could not fit into a
movie theater seat, she called ahead to ask if she could bring her own chair and
use it in the wheelchair section. She was told that she could. However, when
she went to the theater with her chair, she was rudely told that she would not
be able to use it. Birdwell sued the movie theater under the public
accommodations provision of the ADA. 213 The outcome of the case will
depend upon whether Birdwell's obesity is considered to be a disability. Why
must Birdwell's obesity have to be a disability globally for a theater manager to
allow her to bring her own chair to sit in the wheelchair section? Birdwell was
politely making a reasonable request to a theater manager in order to patronize
the theater. She suffered disadvantage because of her disability. If we viewed
impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an
impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 12,102(2).
210 For a general discussion of the cases involving obesity, see James G. Frierson,
Obesity as a Legal Disability Under the ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and State Handicapped
Employment Laws, 44 LAB. LJ. 286 (1993).
211 See Cook v. Rhode Island, Dep't of Mental Health, Retardation and Hospitals, 834
F. Supp. 57 (D.R.I. 1992), affid, 10 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1993).
212 Obesity Bia, spra note 14, at 53.
213 aT
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disability in terms of the disadvantages caused in concrete situations, rather
than on a bipolar scale, we would easily recognize that Birdwell has a
legitimate claim of disability-related discrimination.
Looking at disabilities in terms of disadvantage rather than categorization
also helps us with the slippery slope argument that is often cited when
discussing obesity. Since the term "obesity" does not have a standard
definition, how can we distinguish between someone who is discriminated
against for being merely overweight and for being obese? If we viewed
disabilities in terms of disadvantage, we would not be concerned with that line-
drawing. The body builder who cannot meet the arbitrary weight restrictions of
United Airlines214 would have as valid a claim as Deborah Birdwell who is
classified as "morbidly obese." In both cases, they have been forced to suffer
disadvantage due to their body weight. In both cases, these imposed
disadvantages had nothing to do with their ability to perform their job. They
should be entitled to make an individualized showing of disadvantage.
Similarly, an obese individual who has not experienced disadvantage because of
her obesity should not automatically get the protection of our antidiscrimination
laws. The issue should be disadvantage rather than bipolar classification.
Although the disability laws contain a problematic bipolar framework, they
also contain more individualized assessments than other areas of the law
through various concepts: "reasonable accommodation," "undue hardship,"
"direct threat," and "otherwise qualified." 215 In some cases, such as undue
hardship, the individualized assessment is a determination of the employer's
financial capabilities. 216 In other cases, such as direct threat, it is an
individualized assessment of the employee's risk to self and others. 217 In yet
2 14 See Tudyman v. United Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 739 (D.C. Cal. 1984).
215 Title I of the ADA prohibits discrimination against a "qualified individual with a
disability... who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential
functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires." See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12,111(8). A reasonable accommodation is required unless the covered entity can
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of
the business of such covered entity. See id. § 12,111(9)-(10). The term "qualification
standards" may include "a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the
health or safety of other individuals in the workplace." Id. § 12,113(b).
216 The term "undue hardship" means "an action requiring significant difficulty or
expense, when considered in light of the factors set forth in subparagraph (B)." Id.
§ 12,111(10)(A). Subparagraph (B) specifies four factors relating to the nature and cost of
the accommodation, as well as the financial resources of the covered entity. Id.
§ 12,111(10)(B).
217 The regulations defining "direct threat" require that four individualized factors be
considered: "(1) the duration of the risk; (2) the nature and severity of the potential harm;
(3) the likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and (4) the imminence of the potential
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other cases, such as otherwise qualified, it is a determination of the relationship
between the abilities of the disabled person and the requirements of the job.218
Thus, an individual with HIV infection may be at the early stages of the
disease, may be able to perform her job as a surgeon with no reasonable
accommodation, and may not pose any threat to self or others because of her
diligent use of CDC-recommended barrier precautions. Another individual with
HIV infection may be at an advanced stage of the disease, may be unable to
perform her job as a surgeon because of mental and physical deterioration that
has occurred, and may pose a risk to self and others by trying to perform her
job because CDC-recommended barrier precautions cannot sufficiently protect
her and others from exposure to HIV infection.219 These are people with HIV
infection who must be individually assessed; there is no monolithic treatment
for such persons under the ADA.
In other areas of the law, however, I have argued that we resist
individualized assessments. Instead, we starkly divide people into bipolar
categories and treat them monolithically within those categories. Sometimes,
we recognize a middle or bi category, as in the transracial adoption area, but
that middle category does not indicate that we are beginning to develop a
spectrum. Instead, the middle is simply a new point to define without
consideration of the ameliorative purposes that could be presented by that
middle point. It is time that we learn from the individualized treatment within
the disability rights model.
The lesson, however, is a complicated one because individualized treatment
is administratively difficult to pursue in a fair way, and it is costly. Thus, I
believe that it is too radical to suggest that we completely abandon our current
ameliorative classification system until we have a good individualized system
with which to replace it. I recommend that we begin with those areas of the law
in which classification systems seem to be serving the most important purposes
and seek to refine those classification systems through more individualized
determinations. For those of us in the university setting, admissions and
appointments may be a good place to start. We can begin by looking more
harm." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1992).
2 18 In determining whether an individual is "otherwise qualified," the ADA specifies
that "consideration shall be given to the employer's judgment as to what functions of a job
are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written description before advertising or
interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the
essential functions of the job." 42 U.S.C. § 12,111(8).
219 Compare Bradley v. University of Texas, 3 F.3d 922 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding
H[V-positive surgical technician not otherwise qualified to continue in his employment),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1071 (1994) with Roe v. District of Columbia, 842 F. Supp. 563
(D.D.C. 1993) (permitting HBV-positive firefighter to perform job without any restrictions),
vacated by 25 F.3d 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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closely at who we define as automatically deserving affirmative action in
admissions or appointments, and asking how these individuals meet our
rationales for affirmative action. If our rationale is helping individuals to
overcome disadvantage, then we must engage in an individualized discussion of
disadvantage, while also being mindful of society's group-based rules that
impose disadvantage on nearly all members of certain groups in our society. If
our rationale is a role model theory, then we need to investigate whether these
individuals will seek to serve as appropriate role models. Finally, if our
rationale is diversity of ideas, then we need to inquire how group-based
membership has helped shape the ideas and values of an individual. Most
importantly, we should not allow the children of privilege who have largely
been shielded from disadvantage to benefit from affirmative action under the
first rationale. Ameliorative treatment should be accorded as a first priority to
the most disadvantaged individuals in our society, irrespective of the categories
to which those individuals belong.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to focus on bi categories to improve our
understanding both of the nature of subordination and how we can help
overcome the history of subordination through ameliorative programs. In Part
II, we saw how the law has used (or tried to ignore) the "multiracial" category.
I argued that many of the seminal race cases were about multiracial categories,
although we tend to remember them as being about African-Americans. I then
looked at two contemporary areas of the law in which the courts and
legislatures are currently grappling with the reality of multiracial individuals-
transracial adoptions and affirmative action. Rather than lump people into the
categories "black" and "white" for adoption and affirmative action purposes, I
argued that we should try to develop more individualized determinations that
recognize the multiracial heritage of many individuals who are classified as
black.
In Part Ill, I applied a bi perspective to the area of sexual orientation law. I
showed how the law has tried to construct the category "homosexual" so as to
keep invisible the large number of people in our society who have had same-
sex sexual experiences as well as opposite-sex sexual experiences. Because
these categories have been developed to subordinate people on the basis of
sexual orientation, there is little to be gained from refining these categories
further. Nonetheless, as we currently turn to developing affirmative legislation
in the area of gay rights, I argued that we need to confront how to create
respectful categories. We need to develop those categories mindful of the
spectrum of human sexual behavior.
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In Part IV, I applied a bi perspective to the area of sex and gender. We
have many linguistic terms to describe people who are a mix of sexes and
genders-hermaphrodite, transvestite, transsexual, and androgyny.
Nonetheless, we saw that the law is determined to classify people into bipolar
conceptions of sex and gender (male or female). There is much evidence that
courts and society are very uncomfortable with the middle categories in the sex
and gender area. The Americans with Disabilities Act, for example, explicitly
excludes transvestites from coverage. 220 Transsexual cases are disfavored under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.221 The Olympics continually struggles to find
a classification scheme that will achieve the desired results of classifying
individuals as male or female.222 In many ways, sex and gender classifications
offer the greatest challenge of any of the examples discussed in this Article,
because the classification scheme is a combination of biology and culture. It is
also difficult to assess when classifications exist for ameliorative purposes
rather than subordinating purposes in the sex and gender area. For example, I
argued that it is often subordinating rather than ameliorative for hermaphrodites
or transssexuals to have their biological sex "corrected" through surgery to
help them better fit into our bipolar classification scheme for sex and gender. It
is ironic that the sex and gender area contains so many terms to describe
someone of mixed sex or gender, because the law and society seem more
determined to force individuals into bipolar categories in this area than in any
of the other previously discussed areas of the law. Nowhere else do people
routinely engage in surgery to assist them to fit into a bipolar category. 223 I
220 42 U.S.C. § 12,211()(1).
221 See, e.g., Dobre v. National R.R. Passenger Corp. ("AMTRAK'), 850 F. Supp.
284 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (holding that transsexuals not covered by Title VI).
22 2 See Christopher Anderson, Tests on Athletes Can't Always Find Line Between
Males and Females, WASH. PosT, Jan. 6, 1992, at A3; French Medical Group Says New
Olympic Sex Test Faulty, PHIL. DAILYNEWS, Jan. 29, 1992, at 59.
223 Of course, it is true that some individuals engage in cosmetic surgery to "fix" their
nose or other feature with which they are dissatisfied. Arguably, such cosmetic surgery
assists individuals to look more like the dominant racial group. Similarly, blacks often
straighten (or "relax") their hair to look more acceptable to mainstream society.
Nonetheless, I do not see those examples as people trying to move from one bipolar
category to another. A black woman who relaxes her hair is usually still perceived as black
by herself and others. She is an individual who is trying to fit a dominant set of criteria for
beauty notwithstanding her minority status in society. See generally Katrina Grider, Hair
Salons and Radal Stereotypes: The Inipemnnssible Use of Racially Discriminatory Picing
Schemes, 12 HARv. WOMEN's L.J. 75 (1989). Another way to understand this phenomenon
is that blacks, particularly black women, who refuse to modify their physical appearance by
conforming to white standards (such as relaxed hair) may face more discrimination in the
workplace and elsewhere than blacks who modify their appearance. Id. at 186. This
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therefore argued that the fixation with bipolar categories in this area of the law
may reflect a strong fear of the mixed category. Because of our strongly
negative attitudes to this mixed category, we have not even tried to engage in
any individualized, ameliorative treatment.
In Part V of this Article, I presented a general overview of the perspective
that underlies disabilities rights law. Although disabilities rights law suffers
from the problem of being bipolar in orientation, I argued that it also offers
individualized assessments within the category of "disabled." This area of the
law can help us learn how to conduct respectful, individualized assessments in
other areas of the law while being mindful of the administrative need to retain
some group-based categories.
Thus, by examining four areas of the law-race, sexual orientation,
gender, and disability-we have seen that there is not one way that our laws
and society have treated bi individuals. In some cases, when bi individuals are
able to "pass," they are able to escape some subordinating treatment that they
might otherwise experience. Some light-skinned blacks or married bisexuals,
for example, may sometimes be able to escape discrimination which is
ordinarily visited upon blacks or homosexuals. In other cases, we especially
deplore the members of a bi category, such as transsexuals, not allowing them
any comfortable existence along the spectrum. Yet, in some areas, such as
gender, we simultaneously deplore transvestites while approving of
androgynous individuals, although the difference between these two categories
can often be purely semantic. There is no single story of bi existence, although
there are many stories that reflect our society's obsessive need to categorize
individuals into the polar points of the spectrum irrespective of their physical or
social traits.
In this Article, I have tried to render bi individuals visible. I hope that we
will have such individuals in mind in the future as we create ameliorative
programs to redress a history of group-based subordination in our society. I
hope that we will do a better job in the future of considering how the life
histories of individuals make them deserving of ameliorative treatment as we
create ameliorative programs. We need to be less stereotypical and bipolar in
our thinking about how race, sexual orientation, gender, and disability matter
in people's lives.
Aside from these legal discussions, I also hope this Article has helped each
of us learn more about the bi within us. James Lindgren has said, "[W]riting
about race can be an overwhelming experience emotionally. Anyone who
works in this area must know that, if it doesn't cause you pain, then it's not
problem is similar to the one that I discussed in Part ll.B.1 concerning the possible
preferential treatment of light-skinned blacks compared to darker-skinned blacks.
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about race." 224 I would add that writing about race, sexual orientation, gender,
and disability is also an overwhelming experience emotionally. As an
individual, I have had to think about my own bi's. I realize that I am a dark-
skinned white woman of United States citizenship, who is Jewish but married
to a non-Jewish Canadian citizen, the mother of a mixed-religion and mixed-
nationality child, androgynous, bisexual, and bi-abled. Reading about the pain
we visit upon transsexuals has forced me to think about my own discomfort in
rigid gender-appropriate clothing and single-sex bathrooms. I have come to
admire transsexuals' courage in crossing rigid gender boundaries. 225 I realize
that I know little about my racial and cultural heritage, in part, because of the
forced migration of Jews over the ages. I therefore identify with the lost history
of many people in our society with African ancestors. I have enjoyed reading
about the bi's of others and hope this Article encourages the reader to explore
his or her own bi's as well as to see how the law has helped shape both the
bipolar extremes and the middle. If Albion Tourgde, who was co-counsel in
Plessy v. Ferguson2 6 and a northern white, were to apply to Columbia Law
School in 1995, I wonder what he might say in his statement about racial or
ethnic identity.
224 Lindgren, supra note 15, at 1087.
225 As I was finishing this Article, I was playing with my two-and-one-half year old
daughter. She said to me, "Mommy, today I am going to be a boy. Tomorrow, I am going
to be a girl." I then asked her, "What is mommy, a boy or a girl?" She said, "Oh,
mommies are girls, but today I am going to be a boy, and tomorrow I am going to be a
girl." I then said, "That's great. You can be a boy or a girl anytime you want." She then
smiled mischieviously and said, "Today I am going to be a girl. Tomorrow I am going to
be a boy. You're always going to be a girl because you're a mommy." I wonder when
society will socialize her into believing that she can only be a girl.
226 163 U.S. 537 (1896).

